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Abstract

As autonomous features become pervasive, control strategy research continues.
Levels of Autonomy (LoA) provide a method for describing function allocation between
operators and autonomous system elements. Unfortunately, LoA does not provide the
user interface designer a clear method to distinguish among interface concepts which
impose varying levels of operator workload or result in predictable human or system
performance changes. This limitation arises as LoA does not distinguish functions which
impose significant verses insignificant human workload. For example, a car with
autonomous emergency breaking performs breaking at the highest Level of Autonomy.
However, this function does not affect the primary decisions made by an automobile
driver and automating this function alleviates little, if any, human workload. The current
research suggests an alternate classification scheme, specifically Level of Human Control
Abstraction (LHCA). LHCA describes how an operator controls a system based on the
control tasks performed and the level of decisions made by the operator verses the
system. This thesis will discuss five levels within this framework: Direct Control,
Augmented Control, Parametric Control, Goal Oriented Control, and Mission Capable
Control. Real world and hypothetical systems can be categorized within this framework,
potentially providing a framework that is directly related to human workload and
performance.

xi

A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING AND DISCUSSING LEVELS OF HUMAN
CONTROL ABSTRACTION

I. Introduction
1. General Issue
In a document titled “America’s Air Force: A Call to the Future” and signed by
the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Mark A. Welsh, III, several strategic
directions are proposed for the Air Force. Among these strategic directions are increased
investment in game changing technologies; including unmanned systems, and autonomy
(Welsh, 2015). This vision is enhanced by a document titled “Autonomous Horizons”,
signed by then Chief Scientist of the Air Force, Mica Endsley. Dr. Endsley states that
this document “describes an evolutionary progression that obtains the best benefits of
autonomous software working synergistically with the innovation of empowered airmen”
(Endsley, 2015). Therefore, design tools which enable the creation of systems which
support this synergism are necessary.
For example, robust methods are required to enable the robust control of complex
modern vehicles and tele-robots when control decisions are shared between the operator
and the system itself. In the past, the concept of Level of Autonomy (LoA) has been
relied upon as a potential method to understand the authority granted to the autonomy
within human-machine teams. However, this concept has not provided a robust tool for
describing or evaluating human-machine systems and has come under significant
scrutiny. In 2012 the Defense Science Board (DSB) released a document entitled “The
Role of Autonomy in the DoD Systems.” This report recommends that the DoD suspend
1

the use of conceptual frameworks focused on levels of autonomy. Instead this report
recommends the development of a new framework that: focuses on capabilities, identifies
which cognitive tasks have been delegated to the human verses the system, and makes
system level tradeoffs visible (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
Technology Logistics, 2012). With this guidance, it is clear that a framework is needed
by the DoD to satisfy these requirements.
2. Background
The concept of creating automated systems to has been studied for many years.
System designers have used automation to improve productivity, efficiency, safety,
operator workload, and to permit the control of more complex systems (Scerbo, 1996).
A commonly cited concept within the field of automation is the 10 Levels of
Automation (LoA) developed by Sheridan. The levels deal with the amount of decision
authority the automation has relative to the human (Sheridan, 2011).
Sheridan’s concept of LoA focuses on the level of authority to make decisions
allocated to the computer, not the level of detail of the decisions. This is an important
distinction because delegating some decisions to a computer may have a large impact on
the human while others may not. An example of a system with the highest possible LoA
is automatic headlights on an automobile which turn on when they detect low ambient
light. With this example the system does not require approval from the operator or give a
veto option to the operator before initiating the headlights. However, an automatic
headlight system does not have a very strong impact on the operator’s workload or any
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other human performance consideration. The LoA framework fails to categorize systems
along practical lines which are important to both system operators and system designers.
3. Problem Statement
A framework for system categorization which meets the criteria laid out by the
DSB does not exist. This lack of a framework creates barriers to research into cognitive
task allocation as an independent variable and leveraging findings from past research to
create system improvements (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
Technology Logistics, 2012).
4. Research Objectives
The goal of this research is to develop and present a conceptual framework for
categorizing the control of vehicles and tele-robotics which meets the recommendations
of the DSB as well as to assess the applicability and usefulness of that framework. The
levels of this framework should be defined by the allocation of cognitive functions, and
decisions, to either the human or the system. Each level within the framework should
have an additional layer of decision making reallocated to the system from the human.
The framework should be structured to empower designers and decision makers with the
capability to make system level tradeoffs more visible.
5. Methodology Overview
The methodology of this research has two aspects, first to establish the breadth of
applicability of the proposed conceptual framework and second to show the framework
makes system level tradeoffs visible.
3

A series of real world systems across several domains were analyzed within the
framework. Each system was described in sufficient detail, then each of its control
configurations were categorized within the framework. This process demonstrated that
the framework can be applied to a plethora of systems in use today. It also served to
illustrate similarities between systems controlled at the same tier within the framework,
establishing a justification for conclusions about the cost and benefits related to each
level.
Three hypothetical systems which could be configured to operate at each level
within the framework were also analyzed. This process served to provide precise
examples of how a system could be controlled at each tier, solidifying the boundaries
between each level. Additionally, traits associated with each level were explored during
the hypothetical system analysis.
6. Assumptions
The proposed conceptual firework is assumed to apply only to vehicles and
telerobotics. Other types of systems may benefit from similar analysis on the level of
detail of operator control inputs. However, the focus of this research is the control of
primary motion of vehicles and telerobotics.
Additionally, an assumption exists that as a vehicle or telerobotic system is
controlled at a lower level of detail the operator will require less attention to control that
system effectively. This assumption was based on knowledge of system control and
published literature.

4

7. Scope
This research is confined to introducing the conceptual framework, then
establishing its usefulness by demonstrating its breadth of applicability and the potential
relationship between the framework and system performance as well as Human Systems
Integration (HSI) impacts. In developing the current conceptual framework, it was
necessary to make a number of assertions regarding operator attention and workload
based upon prior experience and published literature; however, verification of these
assertions were outside the scope of the current research.
8. Organization of Thesis
This thesis is organized into six chapters. The first chapter is an introduction.
The second chapter is a literature review. The third chapter introduces the proposed
framework, defining and describing it. The fourth chapter describes the methodology for
demonstrating the framework’s breadth of applicability and ability to make system level
traits visible. The fifth chapter contains the analysis of the framework, as well as systems
analyzed under the framework. The sixth chapter contains conclusions and
recommendations for further research.

5

II. Literature Review
1. Overview
Automation, autonomy, adaptive automation, and levels of autonomy or
automation (LoA) are important aspects of vehicle and telerobotic control. A review of
these concepts, research in these areas, and methods used for analyzing autonomous
systems motivated the development of the framework proposed in this research.
2. Automation Discussion
Automation has been used across many industries to improve productivity,
quality, and efficiency. As Scerbo points out, the aviation industry has successfully used
cockpit automation, showing effective improvement in flight times, fuel efficiency
navigation, and pilot perception. He also states that automation can reduce human
variability and human errors while increasing operations flexibility and allowing the
control of more complex systems (1996). The benefits of automation are numerous,
obvious, and ubiquitous throughout the modern world.
As Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) become more ubiquitous, manpower
demands for controlling those UASs will undoubtedly increase without the development
of significant innovation. In “Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030” the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) specifically calls for the ability of a single pilot
to control multiple UASs simultaneously (US DoD, 2005). There is a myriad of issues
involved with bringing this vision to reality. Some of these issues will, no doubt, be
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resolved with control automation, as Scerbo asserts that more complex systems can be
controlled through the implementation of automation (1996).
Overall, automation has many potential benefits to the DoD and society at large.
However, negative aspects also exist. A difficult to avoid aspect of automation is the
potential loss of engagement by the system operator. As automation increases, the
operator often changes from actively engaged in controlling the system to monitoring the
system as the automation performs many primary control tasks. Regrettably, humans are
not good at vigilance tasks, such as system monitoring, and this often leads to degraded
system performance (Parasuraman, 1986). In addition to struggling with vigilance tasks,
humans can lose skills associated with manual operation if only automated operations are
used (Wickens, Hollands, Banbury, & Parasuraman, 2015). Situation awareness (SA)
can also deteriorate during the mission as operators are removed from decision loops
(Scerbo, 1996). Finally, in some circumstances, operator workload can increase with
increased automation. Scerbo states that when a system is automated, in some cases,
when operations require low supervision the system functions well, but when the system
is stressed the automation can hinder operations (1996).
3. Automation and Autonomy Differentiation
This chapter discusses automation and autonomy in detail, therefore they will
each be clearly defined. Unfortunately, the literature in this area is inconsistent on the
use of these terms. Specifically, some articles within the literature apply the term “level
of automation” (Sheridan, 2011) while others apply the term “level of autonomy” when
discussing a single framework known as LoA (Proud, Hart, & Mrozinski, 2003). Vagia’s
7

thorough literature review paper provides the following definitions and strategies for
differentiation of these terms. Automation describes a system that completes a task
previously completed by a human, while autonomy refers to the capability of a system to
determine the proper course of action and execute that action without operator
intervention (Vagia, Transeth, & Fjerdingen, 2016).
This intermixing of definitions within the literature is important to discuss
because in this research, as with Vagia’s literature review, the term level of autonomy is
used even though the previous researchers themselves used either the phrase “level of
autonomy” or “level of automation”. This is done because the researchers were referring
to the same concept and it allows for easier comparison of taxonomies proposed by
researchers. References to the term autonomy or automation independent of the phrase
LoA will adhere strictly to the definition given by Vagia and colleagues.
4. LoA from Literature
The first pioneers of the concept of LoA were Sheridan and Verplank. Their 1978
paper laid the foundation for this concept (Sheridan & Verplank, 1978). Later in his
2011 literature review Sheridan more clearly explains the levels, as shown in Table 1.
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Table 1 - Sheridan's LoA
Level
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Description

The computer offers no assistance: Human must take all decisions and actions
The computer offers a complete set of decision/action alternatives
Narrows the selection down to a few
Suggests one alternative
Executes that suggestion if the human approves
Allows the human a restricted time to veto before automatic execution
Executes automatically, then necessarily informs the human
Informs the human only if asked
Informs the human only if it, the computer, decides to
The computer decides everything and acts autonomously, ignoring the human
(Sheridan, 2011)
A reader will note that each level of Sheridan’s 10 LoAs increases the amount of

decision authority allocated to the automated agent, and similarly decreases the
requirement for operator approval of those decisions. At level 1, the agent does nothing,
at level 10, the agent does everything. In between, the agent needs less and less approval
before initiating an action. That is, the agent is assigned increasing levels of autonomy
for making and executing a decision.
Although many researchers have tried to create taxonomies describing levels of
autonomy and automation (Clough, 2002; Draper, 1995; Endsley, 1987; Endsley &
Kaber, 1999; Endsley & Kiris, 1995; Lorenz et al., 2001; Ntuen & Park, 1988; Proud et
al., 2003; Riley, 1989; Sheridan & Verplank, 1978), Sheridan and Verplank were the
first. Subsequent attempts to define the levels are based on their concept of allocating
additional decision authority to the agent, and similarly reducing the need for operator
approval of those decisions. There are two notable exceptions to this, they are Chen,
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Haas, & Barnes (2007) and Milgram, Rastogi, & Grodski (1995), who partitioned the
decision space differently as discussed in section 4.2.
Following Sheridan, Endsley’s 1987 taxonomy applies four LoA. Endsley uses
the phrase “Allocation of Roles Between the Expert System and The Pilot” to name these
levels. The levels include:
Level 1: the system makes recommendations to the pilot which he may
choose to act on,
Level 2: the system makes recommendations which it will carry out if the
pilot concurs,
Level 3: the system makes recommendations which it will carry out unless
the pilot vetoes, or
Level 4: the system acts in an automatic fashion with the pilot completely
out of the loop.
(Endsley, 1987)
Interestingly, in a 1999 paper by Endsley and Kaber, while citing this 1987 paper
Endsley reiterates this taxonomy, but titles it as a LoA hierarchy, labeling each level,
providing a slightly different definition of each level, and including a fifth level. The
reiterated taxonomy is:
Level 1: manual control - with no assistance from the system;
Level 2: decision support - by the operator with input in the form of
recommendations provided by the system;
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Level 3: consensual artificial intelligence (AI) - by the system with the
consent of the operator required to carry out actions;
Level 4: monitored AI - by the system to be automatically implemented
unless vetoed by the operator; and
Level 5: full automation with no operator interaction.
(Endsley & Kaber, 1999)
The reader will note that Endsley’s 1987 taxonomy is quite similar to Sheridan
and Verplank’s taxonomy. Endsley uses maximum and minimum levels with manual
control and fully autonomous control, just as Sheridan, but with fewer intermediate
levels. These similarities between Endsley’s and Sheridan’s levels carry throughout later
iterations of LoA taxonomies created by these and other researchers (Vagia et al., 2016).
The concept of LoA has also been applied to different aspects of a task. In their
paper, Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens examine tasks at a detailed level, using the
four-stage model of human information processing. The four stage model consists of
sensory processing, perception/working memory, decision making, and response
selection. They state that each of the four stages can be assigned to a system and
automated. When the stages are assigned to a system, the resulting functions are
correspondingly named: information acquisition, information analysis, decision and
action selection, and action implementation. When these functions are automated the
types of automation are referred to as: acquisition automation, analysis automation,
decision automation, and action automation. Their analysis separates a task into subtasks
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associated with each of the stages. Furthermore, they examine which of these subtasks
should be allocated to either the human or the system.
5. Effects of LoA from Literature
Several studies have been conducted on the effects of LoA on workload and
system performance (Endsley & Kaber, 1999; Kaber & Endsley, 2004). Kaber and
Endsley’s 2003 study found that the LoA was the most important factor in determining
performance and SA. Kaber and Ensley state that LoA was an important influence on
task performance and situational awareness (SA). At the low end of the LoA spectrum
performance improved while at the high end SA was improved (Kaber & Endsley, 2004).
From Kaber and Endsley’s study one sees that the interactions between LoA, SA,
performance, and workload are not simple and straightforward. In their 1999 and 2003
research, Kaber and Endsley used yet another taxonomy of LoA with 10 levels. For
brevity this taxonomy will not be fully described, but their chosen taxonomy is similar to
Sheridan and Verplank’s original 1978 LoA taxonomy. Their research shows that as
LoA increases; workload remains stable, SA is degraded, and overall system performance
improves. However, this only held true up to intermediate LoAs. They state that the
physical implementation of the operator’s decisions was advantageous while performance
was reduced when higher level cognitive tasks were allocated to the system (Endsley &
Kaber, 1999). Endsley & Kaber posit that the reason for poorer performance when
automating higher level cognitive functions was the operator’s loss of focus on task
execution and the self-doubt in their own decisions.
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6. Alternative Related Taxonomies from Literature
All of the LoA taxonomies so far described deal with the authority given to the
system with respect to the level of approval the operator provides over the system’s
decisions. These taxonomies do not directly address the level of detail of decisions
allocated to the system or what decisions remain with the operator. This is a problem
because in many modern systems, especially when real time operation is critical,
Sheridan’s LoA would be 10 for many component technologies even though the operator
is still responsible for making decisions to control the systems on a moment to moment
basis. Importantly, the LoA framework fails to differentiate along lines which have a
meaningful effect on system performance and the amount of operator attention required
for proper system control. Ideally, a framework would differentiate such that the highest
level on the scale corresponded with a dramatically reduced workload and overall
demand placed on the operator for system control.
The fact that component technologies can operate at level 10 even though the
operator remains critical in the control loop can be easily illustrated. For example, once
set, the cruise control on a car does not request permission to adjust the throttle to
maintain speed up a hill, it simply increases power as necessary. In this example the
operator is still fully engaged in the task of driving, both selecting the proper vehicle
speed and making steering control inputs, but the lower level task of setting the proper
throttle valve position has been fully automated. There are many examples of low level
tasks that have been completely delegated to systems operating at Sheridan’s LoA 10, but
the operator remains heavily engaged with the operation of the system. Consequently,
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the effect of the automation on the operator’s overall workload is limited. A framework
has not yet been discussed that describes the important aspect of level of detail of control,
or level of control abstraction.
Milgram discusses a different taxonomy that focuses on the level of control which
is automated. Within his paper, Milgram refers to this taxonomy as both “Levels of
Autonomy” and “Taxonomy of autonomy in remote operations.” Milgram’s work
examines the control of robots, decomposing the level of control into five levels. At the
lowest level, Manual Teleoperation, the operator remains completely in the loop; making
every decision and controlling every motion performed by the robot. At Level 2,
Telepresence, Milgram suggests “some form of master-slave control system, where all
actions of the master arm initiated by the human operator are mimicked by the slave
manipulator” (1995). That is, the human operator communicates exactly how the robot
should move, then the robot determines the servo inputs required to achieve that
movement. Level 3 is Direct/Agent Control, with “the human operator acting as a
director of the task performance and the telerobot serving as the agent” (Milgram et al.,
1995). At this level of control, the human operator provides specific, task level,
instructions to the robot, which the robot then performs. Supervisory Control is
Milgram’s next level where “the human remains in the loop but has no authority to
act.”(Vagia et al., 2016). Unfortunately, Milgram fails to clearly define Supervisory
Control, as does Vagia in her 2016 review of his work. One possible interpretation of
Supervisory Control might be a system where the human operator provides goal level
instructions to the robot, without taking direct control of the robot to accomplish those
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goals. Milgram is also vague regarding his highest level of control, Autonomous
Robotics, but Vagia describes this level as “the human gets out of the loop” (2016). This
could be taken to mean that the autonomous robot must interpret its environment to
decide upon the goals it must achieve and the works to achieve these goals. Figure 1
provides a graphical depiction of Milgram’s LoA taxonomy.

Figure 1 - Milgram’s Taxonomy of Autonomy in Remote Operations, adapted from
original paper (Milgram et al., 1995)

Another way of thinking about LoAs relating to teleoperation is depicted in a
figure by Chen, which has been reproduced in Figure 2 (Chen et al., 2007). Chen does
not directly propose a new taxonomy; however, this graphic includes three different types
of control. Chen also does not refer to the different types of control as different LoA or
even suggest a hierarchy. In fact, Chen provides this as a control structure for a human
operator where the human operator is able to exercise different levels of control,
15

depending upon their needs (Chen et al., 2007). For example, such a control scheme
might enable to human operator to balance their workload and their need for precise
control.

Figure 2 – Graphic based on Chen’s Teleoperation Graphic (Chen et al., 2007)

One possible interpretation of the three control types which Chen calls “Direct
Control,” “Semiautonomous Control,” and “Autonomous Control” will be described here.
Direct Control is the operator determining the exact position and movements of the
system. Semiautonomous Control is the operator setting small incremental goals for the
system to accomplish (i.e., specifying precise tasks to be performed). Autonomous
Control is the operator assigning goals to the system, then permitting the system to
determine how to achieve those goals (Chen et al., 2007).
Milgram and Chen’s work is included here for two reasons, first to give an
alternative conceptual viewpoint of LoA from the literature and second because they
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approach the concept of level of control abstraction that this research focuses on. Neither
of these two researchers directly discuss a generalized framework for discussing the level
of operator control, but their ideas about control occurring at different levels of task detail
are incorporated within the proposed framework.
7. Adaptive or Adaptable Automation
An important concept to discus in the context of automation, and especially LoA,
is adaptive or adaptable automation. Adaptive automation is a system in which the
automation adjust over time due to inputs form the operator or the environment
(Sheridan, 2011). Scerbo states that adaptive automation enables the control tasks
delegated to the system or the operator to change with time (1996). Vagia points out that
some of the human performance issues associated with automation, including
complacency as well as reduction in both situational awareness and operator skill, can be
reduced or resolved by implementing adaptive automation (2016).
One issue with adaptive automation is knowing when to apply it. A concept for
adaptive automation includes monitoring human performance for degradation and
increasing automation as performance decreases has been experimented with (Scerbo,
1996). Unfortunately, this concept has the flaw of being reactive, that is, the system can
only implement adaptive automation once performance has degraded. Another approach
adapts automation based on workload, which is useful because it can be anticipated
situationally (Scerbo, 1996). For example, a pilot expects to have higher workload
during takeoff and landing than during the cruise phase of flight.
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The agent that would determine what LoA is appropriate for any given situation is
referred to as an allocation authority (Sheridan, 2011). That entity would use one of the
methods described to determine the appropriate LoA for the current situation, and then
perform “dynamic function allocation” to adjust the division of labor between the
operator and the system (Vagia et al., 2016).
The concept of Adaptive Automation is important to consider because if
implemented a system’s function allocation and LoA are not static. This adaptive
automation adds an additional layer of complexity to the concept of LoA and may add
additional utility to systems which implement it. A framework for considering adaptive
automation and various trigger methods has been provided by Feigh and colleagues. This
framework provides a discussion of alternative triggers for adaptive automation (Feigh,
Dorneich, & Hayes, 2012) .
8. Evaluation of a Framework
In his 2014 paper “Why the Fitts list has persisted throughout the history of
function allocation” de Winter analyzes Fitts list of 11 statements to be used in
determining proper functional allocation between either a human or a machine (de Winter
& Dodou, 2014; Fitts, 1951). To conduct the analysis de Winter treats Fitts list as a
scientific theory, evaluating it against a list of six criteria which were originally
developed for the cognitive sciences by Jacobs and Granger (Jacobs & Grainger, 1994).
These criteria were later used by Pitt et. al. to pick between alternative theoretical
explanations of scientific observations (Pitt, Myung, & Zhang, 2002). De Winter argues
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that by evaluating Fitts list as a scientific theory for functional allocation the same six
criteria can be used to assess Fitts list. Those criteria are stated in Table 2.

Table 2 - Framework Evaluation Criteria
Criteria
Plausibility
Explanatory adequacy
Interpretability
Simplicity
Descriptive adequacy
Generalizability

Description
Are the assumptions of the model plausible?
Is the theoretical explanation reasonable and consistent with what is
known?
Do the model and its parts make sense? Are they understandable?
Does the model capture the phenomenon in the least complex
manner?
Does the model provide a good description of observed data?
Does the model predict well the characteristics of new, as yet
unobserved data?

(de Winter & Dodou, 2014)
As this method has been applied to analyze Fitts’ list as a scientific theory, this
same analysis method could be applied to evaluate any proposed framework as a
scientific theory.
9. Conclusion
The concept of LoA is one which has many aspects. Numerous researchers have
created LoA taxonomies focused on how much authority a system has over its area of
control, but there has been very little analysis on the effects of the level of detail of
control. As noted by the 2012 DSB cited earlier, the LoA framework does not focus on
capabilities, cognitive functional delegation between the operator and the system, or
make system level trades visible (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition Technology Logistics, 2012). Further, increases in LoAs do not necessarily
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imply decreases in human workload, improvements in human SA, or improvements in
human performance. Therefore, there is a need for an alternate classification method
which addresses a portion of these shortcomings of the existing frameworks.
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III. Conceptual Framework Proposal
This chapter focuses on proposing a conceptual framework for identifying
cognitive functional responsibilities between a system and an operator as suggested by
the DSB with the goal of defining a hierarchy which is expected to differentiate systems
based upon the degree of human attention required. The proposed conceptual framework
examines this subject from a human-centric, as opposed to system-centric, perspective.
The framework focuses on how an operator is controlling a system rather than a
classification for the system itself. Levels within the framework are differentiated by the
level of detail of control inputs made by the operator and are not dependent on system
specifications. The appropriate level of detail for the control inputs an operator provides
is an important aspect of system design. The level of detail of control inputs may affect
both operator workload and overall system performance. In addition, different types of
tasks require different levels of detail of control.
Several informal frameworks for describing the level of detail for control inputs
have been proposed (Chen et al., 2007; Endsley, 2015; Milgram et al., 1995). The goal of
this research is to present and analyze a conceptual framework which satisfies the
recommendations of the DSB. This framework should also facilitate the research and
analysis of the level of detail of operator control inputs for vehicle and tele-robotic
systems.
1. Theory
There have been several attempts to describe the level of detail of operator control
inputs in the past. The three proposals were given by Chen, Milgram, and Endsley. Each
21

proposal provided a means of describing the control of systems, permitting the human
operator to relinquish detailed control of the system under specific conditions (Chen et
al., 2007; Endsley, 2015; Milgram et al., 1995).
Chen’s proposal was very informal and, as noted in the previous chapter, was
presented through a figure within her paper on tele-operated robots. A modified version
of this figure is shown in Figure 2 (Chen et al., 2007). The figure includes three “control
options” and discussion of the figure within Chen’s article included a recommendation
for the appropriate option to use if obstacles or safety issues were present. The first
option was “Direct Control”, which included the descriptive terms manual and
teleoperations. The second “Semiautonomous Control,” was described as planning way
points. The third option was “Autonomous Control” which included the descriptive
terms algorithmic and supervise mission. Chen did not provide any additional detail to
describe these control levels and did not propose a classification framework for control.
In fact, Chen’s use of roughly defined terms for discussion of this topic illustrates the
current requirement for a conceptual framework describing levels of the detail of control.
Milgram proposed a “Taxonomy of autonomy in remote operations” which has
five levels and ranges from “Manual Teleoperation” to “Autonomous Robotics”
(Milgram et al., 1995). Milgram includes a brief description of each level within the
taxonomy shown in Figure 1. In this taxonomy, each increase in the level along the
continuum implies a corresponding decrease in the level of detail the operator must
provide to control the tele-robot.

22

Endsley proposed a taxonomy of “Control Granularity” as an aspect of a system’s
autonomy (Endsley, 2015). Each level of control given requires a different level of detail
of instructions from the operator. Endsley predicts that operator workload should
decrease at higher levels of control granularity (Endsley, 2015). Figure 5 below shows a
diagram from “Autonomous Horizons” published by the USAF Office of the Chief
Scientist, which illustrates Endsley’s Control Granularity framework.

Figure 3 – Endsley’s Control Granularity (Endsley, 2015)
Milgram and Endsley’s proposals each suggest a description of human control
granularity in which systems are classified based upon processes which roughly align
with the granularity of control undertaken by the operator to control the system.
2. A Framework for Analyzing Level of Human Control Abstraction (LHCA)
The purpose of developing a conceptual framework for describing the level of
detail for operator control inputs is two-fold. First, to develop a vocabulary from which
to describe, discuss, understand, and contrast different systems of control. Second, a
conceptual framework can be used to make predictions about the human performance
effects of a control system during the design phase. Therefore, any useful conceptual
framework must be able to classify different levels of control and there must be
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characteristic traits associated with each level that apply across various systems and
ideally across various classes of systems.
This research proposes the Levels of Human Control Abstraction (LHCA)
conceptual framework to describe the level of detail for operator control inputs. The
framework has five levels, including: 1) Direct Control, 2) Augmented Control, 3)
Parametric Control, 4) Goal Oriented Control, and 5) Mission Capable Control. As
LHCA increases, the level of specificity of control inputs required from the operator
decreases.
The LHCA is determined instantaneously based on the level of detail of control
inputs given by the operator at a specified instant. As such, this is not a framework for
classifying a system, but a framework for classifying the level of detail of human control
required at any moment in time. A system may permit the operator to interact with it at
any one of these levels at any moment in time but the LHCA is not, necessarily, a static
attribute of the system. Instead, a given LHCA might correspond to a system state or
configuration, rather than to a system.
The LHCA are defined as follows:
LHCA 1 - Direct Control occurs when the operator controls every aspect of the
system, including actual control surface positions or motor power. During Direct Control
the operator provides continuous control inputs and is responsible for all aspects of
system operation. Examples of systems that operate at LHCA 1 are 1940s era aircraft or
the simplest possible fixed wing remote control aircraft.
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LHCA 2 - Augmented Control occurs when the operator gives control inputs
commanding desired actions, the system then makes final determinations about control
surface positions or motor power. Many, although not all, modern fly-by-wire systems
are operated with Augmented Control. During Augmented Control the operator provides
continuous control inputs and is responsible for guiding the system through maneuvers.
The system is responsible for interpreting the operator inputs to adjust control surface
positions or motor power. Examples of systems that operate at LHCA 2 are an F-117
Nighthawk or a multi-rotor UAS.
For clarification, it should also be noted that not all fly-by-wire systems operate
the same, some are controlled at LHCA 1 and others LHCA 2. Some simply brake the
physical connection between the pilot’s controls and the control surfaces, passing the
control inputs electronically to control surface actuators but not adjusting the inputs for
environmental data. This type of non-augmented fly-by-wire system would be an
example of Direct Control, not Augmented Control because the operator is still
determining the exact position of the control surfaces and engine settings. For precision,
within this research, Direct Control type fly-by-wire systems are referred to as “nonaugmented fly-by-wire” and Augmented Control type fly-by-wire systems are referred to
as “fly-by-wire.”
LHCA 3 - Parametric Control occurs when the operator inputs desired parameters
that the system should meet, the system then uses onboard sensors and control algorithms
to meet those parameters. During Parametric Control the operator gives discrete control
inputs. The operator is responsible for safety monitoring, including obstacle avoidance,
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even when the system is operating correctly without any faults. An example of a system
being operated at LHCA 3 is a commercial airliner with autopilot activated. Examples of
parameters the operator may input would be altitude, airspeed, heading, waypoints, or a
combination of these.
LHCA 4, Goal Oriented Control occurs when the operator inputs desired goals the
system should meet, the system then makes all required decisions to meet those goals. A
goal is a task without follow-on instructions beyond ‘notify operator when complete.’
During Goal Oriented Control the operator gives discrete control inputs. The operator's
monitoring role is reduced to planning the next goal and monitoring for system failures
as, when functioning properly, the system can complete the goal without further
guidance. An example of a system operating at LHCA 4 is a DJI Phantom 4 Pro, a
commercially available recreational multi-rotor UAS, executing the “ActiveTrack” goal.
This goal consists of keeping a specified target centered in the camera’s field of view,
avoiding obstacle collisions, and following the target until “ActiveTrack” is disengaged.
LHCA 5, Mission Capable Control occurs when the operator enters pre-launch
mission goals at a level of detail which, when combined with standard operating
procedures (SOPs) and rules of engagement (ROEs), are sufficient to accomplish the
mission. At this level, the system operates independently and autonomously after the
operator initiates the mission. During Mission Capable Control the operator gives
discrete control inputs before the mission begins. The operator has no mandatory
monitoring role during mission execution. An example of a system operating at LHCA 5
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is an autonomous car that travels to a desired location with no inputs from the driver
other than the desired destination.
3. Rules and Guidelines for the LHCA framework
The LHCA is determined instantaneously based on the control inputs and
responsibilities of the system operator at any given time as a system can transition from
being controlled at one level to another. This is a common occurrence that routinely
happens during the operation of many modern systems. The transition from one LHCA
to another can be initiated by either the operator or by the system, triggered by
predetermined criteria. An example of one of these transitions across LHCA is the
initiation of an aircraft’s autopilot system. Initially, the operator flies the aircraft with
continuous control inputs, at either LHCA 1 or 2, depending on the system. The operator
then activates the aircraft autopilot and begins controlling the aircraft using Parametric
Control, LHCA 3. The operator may command a course, an altitude, and an airspeed, the
autopilot system will manipulate the control surfaces and engine power to meet those
parameters.
An example of involuntary, or system controlled, transition across LHCA is the
activation of an F-16’s Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System (Auto-GCAS).
During normal flying conditions, with the autopilot disabled, an F-16 is controlled at
LHCA 2. Control inputs are given by the operator, then a fly-by-wire system translates
the inputs, combined with environmental data, such as pressure and airspeed, then sends
signals to the control surface actuators. However, if the onboard Auto-GCAS system
detects an impending ground collision, the aircraft will transition to LHCA 3, Parametric
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Control. The system commands the control surfaces to level off the aircraft and maintain
safe flight parameters. This transition from LHCA 2 to LHCA 3 can occur without a
command from the operator.
As was previously discussed, LHCA is determined based on the level of detail of
control inputs given by the operator. A potential area of confusion which must be
examined closely is the difference between a powered assist to manipulate a system
verses a less specific control input. To illustrate the difference, examine the simplest
remote control aircraft. The operator controls the aircraft with a transmitter which has
pair of joysticks, as shown in Figure 4. The left joystick controls the throttle with
forward and backward motions, the rudder with left and right motions. The right joystick
controls the elevators with forward and backward motions, the ailerons with left and right
motions. The remote-control aircraft receives control inputs from the handheld
transmitter. The receiver on the aircraft is connected to servos that manipulate the
control surfaces. Even though the operator is not physically moving the control surfaces,
the operator is directly determining their position. There is not a determination made by
the remote-control aircraft as to the position of what the control surfaces should be, the
servo position is entirely determined by the position of the joysticks on the transmitter.
Therefore, the system is being controlled at LHCA 1, Direct Control, even though there is
not a physical link between the operator and the control surfaces.
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Figure 4 – Remote Control Aircraft Transmitter, arrows signal joystick movements,
modified from (“Vector - vector remote control rc transmitter black icon,” 2017)
Another situation to be considered in the determination of an operator’s LHCA is
the manipulation of several controls simultaneously, causing potential confusion about
the operator’s current LHCA. This issue is resolved by examining the operator’s most
detailed control input and assigning the LHCA based on that aspect of control. Consider
an operator driving a car equipped with cruise control, but not initially engaged. The
driver is operating both the steering wheel and the throttle with a high level of detail,
directly controlling the steering angle of the tires while simultaneously controlling the
vehicle’s throttle. Even if the car has power steering, the car is still being operated at
LHCA 1 because the power steering is an example of a powered assist to manipulate a
system. When the operator engages the cruise control the operator is still directly
determining the steering angle of the tires, but is now controlling the vehicle’s throttle
indirectly using the vehicle’s speed as a parameter to be maintained. The LHCA can be

29

determined by using the most detailed aspect of control. In this case the LHCA is still
Direct Control.
The formalized rules for determining LHCA are:
1) LHCA is determined instantaneously based on the level of detail of control inputs
given by the operator.
2) LHCA is determined by the most detailed control input given by the operator.

4. LHCA Decision Tree
The decision tree shown in Figure 5 assists in determining an operator’s current
LHCA. This decision tree captures the rules and definitions described earlier in this
chapter. A user can simply answer each question down the tree until they have arrive at
the appropriate LHCA.

Figure 5 - LHCA Decision Tree
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This decision tree should be used to assist in classifying the LHCA a system is
being controlled with. For illustrative purposes, examples of systems being operated at
each LHCA are examined below:
1) A simple motor boat – A photo of this system is shown in Figure 6 for clarity. Figure 6 does
not show the motor boat being controlled at all, however it does illustrate the control
capabilities of the boat. The decision tree analysis will assume that the example motor boat is
being controlled by a single operator traveling from one location to another.
a. Question 1: Is the operator giving any continuous control inputs? Answer: Continuous
control, the operator is giving continuous control inputs for both yaw and motor
power, the only two possible control inputs.
b. Question 2: Is the operator deciding the exact position of any control surfaces/servo
position/motor power with a control input? Answer: Yes, the operator is deciding both
the exact motor power and exact angle of thrust vectoring.
c. Based on this analysis, the motor boat is operated at LHCA Level 1, Direct Control.

Figure 6 – A simple motor boat (“Small Motor Boat Waiting Ferry Passengers
Stock Photo,” 2017)
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2) Multi-rotor UAV – A photo of this system is shown in Figure 7 for clarity. The operator of
this system uses joysticks to control the movement of this UAV. An internal processor
receives the joystick inputs and translates them into rotation speeds for each motor.
a. Question 1: Is the operator giving any continuous control inputs? Answer: Continuous
control, the operator is giving continuous control inputs for yaw, pitch, role, and
throttle.
b. Question 2: Is the operator deciding the exact position of any control surfaces/servo
position/motor power with a control input? Answer: No, the operator is inputting
desired motions for the UAV, but the internal processor is determining the motor
power for each motor based on those inputs.
c. The multi-rotor is operated at LHCA Level 2, Augmented Control.

Figure 7 – A multi-rotor UAV (“Drone multicopter in field,” 2017)
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3) A commercial airliner at cruising altitude - During this phase of flight the operator of this
system typically employs the autopilot system to control the aircraft. The autopilot system
has Lateral Navigation (LNAV), Vertical Navigation (VNAV), and auto-throttle capabilities.
The operator inputs a desired heading, altitude, and air speed then the autopilot acts to
achieve those parameters. The operator is still responsible for safety of flight even while the
autopilot is activated.
a. Question 1: Is the operator giving any continuous control inputs? Answer: Exclusively
discrete control, the operator has given discrete control inputs.
b. Question 2: Is the operator responsible for safety monitoring and obstacle avoidance?
Answer: Yes, the operator remains responsible for avoiding collisions with other
aircraft.
c. The LHCA for a commercial airliner being operated with autopilot is Level 3, Parametric
Control.

4) A modern car executing an auto-park maneuver - During this phase of operation the operator
has delegated all aspects of control to achieve the goal of parallel parking to the car. While
from a liability standpoint the operator is still responsible for safety, from the perspective of
task distribution responsibilities the system is responsible for safety monitoring. The
operator’s overall mission was to travel from point A to point B not simply to park the car.
a. Question 1: Is the operator giving any continuous control inputs? Answer: Exclusively
discrete control, the operator has given the discrete control input to park the car.
b. Question 2: Is the operator responsible for safety monitoring and obstacle avoidance?
Answer: No, the operator has simply specified the goal to park the car near the
current location and the car is responsible for avoiding collisions.
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c. Question 3: Did the operator direct the system to achieve a goal within the mission or
complete the entire mission? Answer: Goal within mission. The operator specified
the goal to park the car near the current location, not travel all the way from point
A to point B.
d. The LHCA for an automobile executing an auto-park maneuver as described is Level 4,
Goal Oriented Control.
5) A mapping UAV - The operator specifies an area to be mapped then hands-off control to the
vehicle until the UAV has mapped the area. The UAV will take off, use the global
positioning system (GPS) to navigate, collect aerial photography of the area, and then return
to base and land. The UAV additionally monitors for any obstacles and avoids detected
obstacles.
a. Question 1: Is the operator giving any continuous control inputs? Answer: Exclusively
discrete control, the operator has given the discrete control inputs by specifying the
area to mapped.
b. Question 2: Is the operator responsible for safety monitoring and obstacle avoidance?
Answer: No, the operator has simply input the mission to map the specified area, the
UAV is responsible for obstacle avoidance.
c. Question 3: Did the operator direct the system to achieve a goal within the mission or
complete the entire mission? Answer: Entire mission. The operator is hands-off until
the UAV returns and does not give inputs along the way.
d. The LHCA of the mapping UAV is Level 5, Mission Capable Control.

These example systems illustrate the use of the LHCA decision tree at each level
as shown in Figure 5.
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In summary, this chapter has reviewed the background literature relevant to the
level of operator control abstraction, defined the LHCA framework, provided a decision
tree, and a series of examples to clarify this framework as well as illustrated the use of the
decision tree.
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IV. Methodology
1. Chapter Overview
The Level of Human Control Abstraction (LHCA) conceptual framework was
formally introduced in the previous chapter, this chapter will propose a suitable method
for analyzing the LHCA framework. The purpose of the LHCA framework is to meet the
recommendations laid out by the DSB described in chapter 1 (2012). As a prerequisite to
those recommendations the framework must also be shown to be applicable to systems in
use by the DoD. The analysis served to demonstrate both the LHCA breadth of
applicability and ability to make system level traits visible.
It must be shown that a multitude of different vehicle and tele-robotic systems can
be categorized within the LHCA framework. It must also be shown to be a precise
enough framework to describe differences between various operator control
configurations. To these ends a series of examples were analyzed using the LHCA
framework. These examples were both real world and hypothetical systems. The real
world system examples were analyzed to demonstrate that many current vehicle and
telerobotic systems can be categorized within the LHCA framework. The hypothetical
system examples explored the precision of the LHCA framework, illustrating how
changes in control result in a LHCA reclassification. The hypothetical systems chosen
can be configured to be controlled at each LHCA.
The ability to make system level traits of a control configuration visible, was also
illustrated through the analysis of the real world and hypothetical system examples. The
benefits and disadvantages of using a specific LHCA to control a system was explored.
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This trade space analysis of LHCA may help system designers to determine the
appropriate LHCA for the system they are designing.
With this analysis completed, the LHCA conceptual framework was shown to
provide a descriptive vocabulary for the level of detail of operator control inputs for
vehicles and tele-robotic systems.
2. Analysis of Real World Systems within the LHCA Conceptual Framework
A series of real world systems which employ various levels of automation were
selected and analyzed using the LHCA framework. One goal of this analysis was to
illustrate that many systems across many industries, which are controlled in different
ways can be analyzed within the LHCA framework. This step was undertaken to
demonstrate the breadth of the framework’s applicability. The other goal of this analysis
was to qualitatively consider the human performance impacts of controlling a system at
each LHCA. If a robust index of traits associated with the use of each LHCA were
developed, system designers could reference the index to make informed design decisions
with respect to how their system should be controlled.
The real world systems were selected from across industries, time periods, and
levels of sophistication. The LHCA for other systems could also have been analyzed and
classified, but the selection covered a breadth of control techniques under consideration
for DoD and related systems.
As discussed in Chapter 3, LHCA is not necessarily a static trait of a system, but
an instantaneous description of how a system is being controlled, typically associated
with one or more system states. Therefore, each real world system analyzed had a
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detailed description of each control configuration before the LHCA was assessed. Some
systems are not capable of being controlled using more than one LHCA, others can
change among multiple LHCA circumstantially or as dictated by the operator. Each
system analyzed included a list of LHCA an operator can use to control the system as
well as a description of how the transition is accomplished.
Specific, brand name systems were chosen for this analysis instead of generic
systems. This specificity was required to properly discuss how the system is controlled
and properly analyze how control decisions were made with the system. A description of
how these systems operate was included for each system within the analysis. A brief
description of why that system was included and a system overview is given below. The
systems analyzed within the LHCA framework are shown in Table 3:
Table 3 – Real World Systems Analyzed and the LHCAs provided by each system
based upon the analysis

Category
Automotive

Aircraft

System
Volvo XC90
P-51 Mustang
B-2 Spirit
F-16 Falcon

Available Levels of Human Control Abstraction
1
2
3
4
5
X
X

Airbus A300-600R
UAG

UAV

Carnegie Mellon
University, Humanoid
Robot Prototype

X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X

DJI Phantom 4
PRENAV Drone
System

X

X

X

X
X
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1) 2017, Volvo XC90. This automobile has several subsystems that relate to vehicle
control including power steering, power brakes, automatic traction control, anti-lock
brakes, cruise control, adaptive cruise control, lane keeping aid, park assist pilot, and
pilot assist. This vehicle was chosen because it has many features that affect the
LHCA, however this vehicle is not an anomaly; most competitive automotive
manufactures have equivalent systems. In the Volvo XC90, each of these subsystems
relating to vehicle control can be active or inactive at any moment in time and can be
operated in conjunction with several other subsystems, resulting in a large number of
potential system states. Each of these features will affect the LHCA differently
allowing the system to be operated at LHCA 1, 2, or 3. A discussion of how the
many different subsystems influence the operator’s LHCA serves to introduce LHCA
categorization in a context readers are likely familiar with.
2) 1940, North American Aviation P-51 Mustang. This aircraft is completely manual
and can only operate at LHCA 1, Direct Control. A detailed description of how the
operator controls this vehicle demonstrates an example of a pre-computer control
system.
3) 1989, Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit. This aircraft is an example of an inherently
unstable system that cannot be effectively controlled at LHCA 1. This aircraft is
described as unstable because, unlike a stable aircraft, if left completely uncontrolled
after a disturbance it will not return to straight and level flight. This aircraft is able to
be flown by hand at LHCA 2, Augmented Control, or operated using an autopilot
system at LHCA 3, Parametric Control. In addition, an accident caused by the flyby-wire system was analyzed. This analysis demonstrated a possible disadvantage of
systems controlled with a LHCA greater than 1.
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4) 1976, General Dynamics F-16 Falcon. This aircraft is equipped with a fly-by-wire
system, an autopilot system, and an automatic ground collision avoidance system
(Auto-GCAS). These different control systems will allow this aircraft to be
controlled at LHCA 2 or 3. Analysis of the transition between LHCA in this case
was thought-provoking because the system can automatically transition to LHCA 3
from LHCA 2 without any input from the operator if certain criteria, such as
impending controlled flight into terrain, is met.
5) 1974, Airbus A300-600R. A specific instance of an accident in this aircraft, the loss
of China Airlines' Flight 140 on April 26, 1994, was analyzed. This accident was
caused because the pilot was incorrect about the LHCA he was operating the aircraft
with. The pilot thought he was operating the aircraft with LHCA 2, but in fact, he
was operating the aircraft with LHCA 3. This analysis helped illustrate potential
brittleness of autonomous systems and help to develop a design recommendation
regarding LHCA transitions.
6) 2006, Manufactured by Kawada Industries, modified by Carnegie Mellon University
(CMU) Humanoid Robot Prototype (HRP) (Chestnutt, Michel, Nishiwaki, Kuffner,
& Kagami, 2006). This bipedal robot was modified by CMU to operate at LHCA 2,
Augmented Control. Analysis of this system will help to demonstrate that the
important factor in determining LHCA is the operator’s perspective of the control
inputs, not the sophistication of algorithms used to implement the operator’s control.
7) 2016, DJI Phantom 4. This system is a consumer quad-rotor UAS with several
features enabling it to be operated with LHCA 2, 3, 4, or 5. The versatility of control
methods and broad functionality across the LHCA spectrum made it an excellent
system to analyze. This analysis illustrated several key aspects of the LHCA
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framework and served to illustrate the benefits of operating a system at a particular
LHCA for a given goal.
8) 2016, PRENAV Drone System. This system is a cellular transmission tower
inspection UAS which can only be operated at LHCA 5. Analysis of this system,
specifically the design decision to only allow operation at LHCA 5, will illustrate
how training and liability can affect system design requirements by establishing
desired LHCA. This is an important discussion because of a potential new
generation of UAVs and UAGs operating at LHCA 5 within industry and the DoD.

3. Analysis of Hypothetical Systems within the LHCA Conceptual Framework
The analysis of real world systems within the LHCA conceptual framework
served to illustrate the benefits and drawbacks of operating at a LHCA and provide
clarifying examples of the distinctions between each LHCA. The analysis of several
hypothetical systems which can be operated across the LHCA spectrum demonstrated the
precise distinction between each LHCA. Additionally, similar to the real world system
analysis, the hypothetical system analysis illustrated some benefits and drawbacks of
each LHCA. There were three hypothetical systems analyzed. Each system included a
configuration which was operated at each LHCA. The three hypothetical systems were a
small fixed wing UAV, a bipedal Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV), and an explosive
ordinance disposal (EOD) UGV. Table 4 shows the control configurations of the
hypothetical systems which were analyzed.
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Table 4 - Hypothetical Systems Analyzed
System
Fixed Wing UAV
Bipedal Robot
EOD UGV

1
X
X
X

LHCA of Control Configuration
2
3
4
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

5
X
X
X

The hypothetical fixed wing UAV was a small (<10 lb) aircraft with a radio
receiver, ailerons, elevators, rudder, and an electric motor driving a propeller. Each of
the control surfaces were manipulated by electric servos. The control inputs given by the
operator as well as required onboard navigational equipment and sensors was dependent
on the system configuration and tied to the LHCA. For example, at LCHA 1 the
autopilot will be disabled and at LHCA 3 the autopilot will be enabled. This hypothetical
fixed wing UAV should be considered a baseline to which the other two hypothetical
systems can be compared.
The hypothetical bipedal UGV was a five-foot-tall humanoid robot. The UGV
has articulated ankle joints, knee joints, and hip joints, as well as arms to assist with
balance while walking. The UGV has different systems onboard to enable control at each
LHCA just as the hypothetical UAV does. The selected control configuration affects the
subsystems such as optical sensors, gyroscopes, and GPS which allow the system to
operate at each LHCA. Analysis of this bipedal UGV allowed consideration of how a
complex, unstable system might be controlled at each LHCA.
The hypothetical EOD UGV was a rugged treaded vehicle with an arm and
gripper used for manipulation of an explosive device. The analysis of this UGV allowed
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consideration of how a system with multiple phases of operation, transit and
manipulation, could be controlled during each phase. This analysis also enabled study of
each LHCA when precise and smooth detailed motion was required, as with the explosive
device manipulation phase of operation.
4. Methodology for Evaluation of Framework as a Theory
The methodology described in this chapter provides a basis for evaluation of the
LHCA conceptual framework. The framework was evaluated per the criteria applied by
de Winter to asses Fitt’s list. Those criteria were plausibility, explanatory adequacy,
interpretability, simplicity, descriptive adequacy, and generalizability (de Winter &
Dodou, 2014). As part of the process do determine the framework’s explanatory and
descriptive adequacy, traits about the control of a system which can be determined based
on the LCHA were discussed.

43

V. Analysis and Results
1. Chapter Overview
The methodology for analyzing the LHCA conceptual framework used in this
research was proposed in the previous chapter, this chapter describes the analysis. The
analysis served to draw useful conclusions and generalizations about systems which are
operated at each LHCA and to show that the LHCA framework has met its two goals. As
described in the Chapter 3 the two goals of the LHCA framework are: 1) to develop a
vocabulary from which to describe, discuss, understand, and contrast different systems of
control and 2) to make predictions about the human performance effects of a control
system during the design phase. In addition to meeting the goals of the framework, it will
be evaluated in a fashion similar to de Winter’s evaluation of Fitts list and compared to
the recommendations of the DSB (de Winter & Dodou, 2014; Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology Logistics, 2012).
2. Analysis of Real World Systems within the LHCA Conceptual Framework
By categorizing systems from different domains within the LHCA framework the
breadth of applicability of the framework is demonstrated. Each system analyzed in this
section includes a system description sufficient to describe the control systems which
influence LHCA as well as each configuration of the system categorized within the
LHCA framework. The systems chosen for this analysis are listed in Table 3. Finally,
several systems include an accident description and analysis which relates to the LHCA
the system was operated at during the accident.
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During this analysis, the LHCA Decision Tree presented in Chapter 3 will be used
to determine the LHCA for each configuration of the systems.

2017 Volvo XC90 LHCA analysis
The first system to be analyzed is the 2017 Volvo XC90. This automobile has
several subsystems that relate to vehicle control including power steering, power brakes,
automatic traction control, anti-lock brakes, cruise control, adaptive cruise control, lane
keeping aid, park assist pilot, and pilot assist. A brief discussion of each of these sub
systems and the functionality they provide will add clarity to the analysis.
•

Both power steering and power brakes are hydraulic systems which add mechanical
assistance to the operator’s manipulation of the tire steering angle and brake pads.
The systems are active any time the vehicle’s engine is on. The operator uses
continuous control inputs on the steering wheel and brake pedal. The power steering
hydraulic system substantially boosts the force applied to the car’s steering arm which
in turn sets the tire steering angle. The power brake hydraulic system boosts the force
applied to the brake pad which pushes against the brake rotor to apply braking force
to the tires. Importantly, neither of these systems are making determinations about
what the steering angle should be or how much braking force should be applied. The
operator is making the determinations regarding how the vehicle should be controlled,
and simply receives a mechanical assist. This concept is similar to a lever and a
fulcrum for lifting an object, the lever operator sets the position of the lever and is
receiving a mechanical assist to move the object.
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•

Automatic traction control functions by sensing if the tire is slipping against the road
surface and reducing the force applied to the wheel if slipping is detected. This
system is interpreting the operator’s throttle inputs and making determinations about
the appropriate force to apply to the wheels for maximum performance.

•

Anti-lock brakes function similar to the automatic traction control system, but with
braking force instead of engine produced force. The anti-lock brake system senses if
the tire is slipping against the road surface. If slippage, or skidding, is detected the
anti-lock brake system cycles the brake pad force applied to the brake rotor on and
off. This cycling prevents loss of vehicle control by preventing a sustained skid
during emergency braking conditions (American Automobile Association Foundation
for Traffic Safety, 2017).

•

Cruise control functions as a simple regulator. When the operator activates the cruise
control system the vehicle makes throttle decisions to maintain the current speed.

•

Adaptive cruise control is similar to legacy cruise control but regulates a second
parameter based upon information sensed from the environment. Once the operator
has activated the adaptive cruise control system, the system will use the throttle and
brake to regulate distance between the XC90 and the vehicle in front of the XC90. If
there is not a vehicle in front of the automobile the system will function like the
legacy cruise control system.

•

Lane keeping aid is activated any time the vehicle is traveling above 45 miles per
hour (mph) unless specifically deactivated by the operator. This system uses optical
sensors to determine the vehicle’s position between lane marker lines. If the system
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senses that the vehicle is too close to the lane’s edge, a small torque is applied to the
steering wheel, centering the vehicle in the lane. An additional vibration indicator
within the steering wheel is activated if the lane keeping aid intervenes to provide
tactile feedback to the user. This system is temporarily deactivated if the operator
uses the turn signals to indicate an intentional lane change.
•

When activated by the operator, the park assist aid system applies optical sensors to
search for a parking spot (either parallel or perpendicular) as the operator drives
forward slowly. When a potential spot is detected the system will inform the operator
and the operator can choose to have the system park the vehicle. The operator will
then put the vehicle in reverse and give brake pedal control inputs as the system
controls the steering wheel and gives braking instructions to the operator while the
vehicle is parked.

•

Pilot assist will control all aspects of the vehicle’s travel when activated. The vehicle
will control the steering wheel, brake, and throttle while the operator monitors. For
legal and liability reasons the operator is instructed to stay attentive and keep a hand
on the wheel, but unless the operator overrides the system all steering, brake, and
throttle control inputs are provided by the pilot assist system.

•

The automatic traction control, anti-lock brakes, and lane keeping aid systems are
normally not activated consciously by the operator. There is a switch to disable these
systems, but these systems are actively monitoring driving conditions to intervene
when required under normal operational procedures. From a LHCA perspective,
these systems will not affect the LHCA while monitoring, only when augmenting the
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operator’s control inputs. For example, during a skid, when the anti-lock braking
system activates.
As shown in Table 3 this vehicle can be operated at LHCA 1, 2, or 3. The LHCA
is determined by the operator activating or deactivating the subsystems described above.
First, consider a configuration where the following systems are activated: power
steering, power brake, automatic traction control, anti-lock brakes and cruise control.
The first question of the decision tree is “Is the operator giving any continuous control
inputs?” the answer to this question is yes, continuous control, because the operator is
providing continuous control inputs for the steering wheel and the brake. The second
question is “Is the operator deciding the exact position of any control surfaces/servo
position/motor power with a control input?” the answer to this is yes, the operator is
determining the exact steering angle of the front wheels. Therefore, even though the
operator has delegated direct control of the throttle control and brake control to the cruise
control, anti-lock brakes, and traction control systems, the operator is still operating the
vehicle at LHCA 1, direct control.
Next consider a configuration where the adaptive cruise control is activated.
Again, the operator has released direct control of some aspects of control but not others.
The adaptive cruise control system does not affect the steering angle of the tires. The
operator is still controlling the vehicle at LHCA 1.
If the operator were to activate the park assist aid system, then the operator only
provides control inputs with the brake pedal. In this case, under normal circumstances,
the answer to both the first and second questions in the decision tree are yes and the
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LHCA is still 1, Direct Control. However, if ice were to cause the car to skid during the
parking maneuver and the anti-lock brakes were to activate, then the operator would be
controlling the vehicle at LHCA 2. The LHCA changes because the only aspect of
control the operator has been tasked with is now being augmented by the anti-lock brake
system.
If the operator chooses to activate both the adaptive cruise control and the lane
assist aid then the operator is potentially releasing direct control of all three aspects of
control: the throttle, the brake, and the steering angle of the tires. For this scenario
assume that the operator keeps a hand on the steering wheel as required by the
manufacturer, but does not provide control inputs. The operator is only attentively
monitoring the vehicle for safety. Using the decision tree to determine the LHCA the
answer to the first question is no, the operator is using discrete control inputs. In this
case the second question is “Is the operator responsible for safety monitoring and
obstacle avoidance?” The answer to this question is yes, the operator is using the
parameters of vehicle speed, distance between vehicles, and distance from the vehicle to
the lane markers to control the vehicle. If a deer were to wonder onto the road the
vehicle would not be capable of avoiding the obstacle. Additionally, if a sharp corner
were in the road the vehicle would not be able to appropriately slow down for a safe
turning maneuver. Therefore, the LHCA is Level 3, Parametric Control.
Finally, if the operator were to activate the pilot assist system and release the
steering wheel then the vehicle is being operated in virtually the same way as if the active
cruise control and lane assist subsystems were simultaneously activated as described

49

above. The answers to the decision tree questions would be discrete control and yes, the
LHCA is Level 3, Parametric Control.
The 2017 Volvo XC90 cannot be controlled at LHCA 4 or 5. The system cannot
be operated at LHCA 4 because the operator cannot input a goal for the vehicle to
achieve and then remain uninvolved with vehicle control until that goal is achieved. If,
for example, the park assist system did not require operator brake inputs, when activated,
the vehicle would be controlled at LHCA 4. The vehicle cannot be operated at LHCA 5
because the operator cannot input the mission and then disengage from vehicle control.
If the operator could, from a stop, command the vehicle to drive to the nearest grocery
store, then LHCA 5 would be possible.
Categorizing the 2017 Volvo XC90 in all of its different configurations with
activated and deactivated relevant subsystems illustrates the versatility of the LHCA
framework within the automotive domain. Additionally, addressing which LHCA are not
attainable and why helps to show how similar systems could be analyzed under the
LHCA conceptual framework.

1940 North American Aviation P-51 Mustang LHCA analysis
The operator controls this aircraft in flight by manipulating a control stick, rudder
pedals, and a throttle lever. The control systems are simple, using pullies and cables to
translate the operator’s manipulations of the control input devices directly into physical
motions of the ailerons, elevator, rudder, and the air intake throttle valve.
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The answer to the first question in the LHCA Decision Tree, “Is the operator
giving any continuous control inputs?” is yes, continuous control inputs. The operator
provides continuous control inputs for the control stick and the rudder pedals. The
answer to the second question “Is the operator deciding the exact position of any control
surfaces/servo position/motor power with a control input?” is also yes. The operator has
direct control over all aspects of the control surfaces and engine settings. The P-51 is a
classic example of LHCA 1, Direct Control, illustrating how a simple system can be
controlled directly by the operator.

1989, Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit
The control systems of this aircraft are interesting because of the contrast to the
simplicity of the P-51’s control systems. Whereas the P-51 is solely controlled by the
position of the operator’s control input devices, the B-2 has a complex fly-by-wire system
which interprets the position of the control devices as well as environmental data to
determine the proper flight settings. Specifically, there are 24 pitot-static sensors
mounted flush with the skin of the aircraft which are used to calculate air speed, altitude,
angle of attack, as well as other flight data. When the operator pulls back on the control
stick the flight computer combines that input with information from the pitot-static
sensors to set the control surfaces in a configuration which will pitch the aircraft’s nose
up. This is very different than the P-51 control system which will directly move the
elevators as the operator pulls the control stick back.
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This aircraft has two applicable flight modes which were analyzed within the
LHCA conceptual framework. The first was with the autopilot disengaged and the
second was with the autopilot engaged, maintaining specific flight parameters.
With the aircraft in the first configuration, autopilot disengaged, the answer to the
first decision tree question, “is the operator giving any continuous control inputs?” is yes,
continuous control inputs are being used. The answer to the second question “Is the
operator deciding the exact position of any control surfaces/servo positions/motor power
with a control input?” is no, the fight computer is determining those positions and
settings. Therefore, the LHCA is 2, Augmented Control.
The fly-by wire system is used because of the complexity of controlling the flight
of the B-2, caused by its inherent flight instability. Constant adjustments would need to
be made across many control settings to control this aircraft and these control settings
would place extreme workload on the pilot, assuming the pilot was capable of performing
these control settings in a timely fashion. Therefore, the fly-by-wire system in this
aircraft greatly reduces the pilot workload and enables this aircraft to be effectively
controlled.
With the aircraft in the second configuration, autopilot engaged, the answer to the
first decision tree question, “is the operator giving any continuous control inputs?” is no,
exclusively discrete control inputs are being used. The answer to the second question “is
the operator responsible for safety monitoring and obstacle avoidance?” is yes, the
aircraft is not detecting and taking steps to avoid either stationary or moving obstacles, it
is simply maintaining flight parameters. Therefore, the LHCA is 3, Parametric Control.

52

On 23 February, 2008 a B-2 at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, crashed 17
seconds after takeoff because of a failure in the sensors which feed data to the flight
control system. Per the official accident report moisture contaminated three of the 24
surface mounted pitot-static sensors. These sensors indicated to the flight computer that
the aircraft needed to pitch the aircraft nose up. In response, the flight computer
commanded the control surfaces to put the aircraft into a steep climb. The operator
pushed forward on the control stick in an attempt to overcome the pitch up, but this
control input was not passed to the control surfaces as the operator intended because of
the corrupted pitot-static data. The aircraft’s high angle of attack caused the aircraft to
stall, the operators ejected, and the aircraft was lost (USAF, 2008). This accident was the
most expensive Class A accident in USAF history. This mishap is an example of how, by
allocating control decisions to automation, brittleness and potential faults are added to the
system.

1976, General Dynamics F-16 Falcon.
The F-16 is equipped with three systems that are relevant to LHCA analysis. A
fly-by-wire flight control system, an autopilot, and the Automatic Ground Collision
Avoidance System (Auto-GCAS).
From a LHCA perspective, the fly-by-wire control system functions similar to the
B-2’s flight control system. By applying pressure to the control stick and rudders the
operator commands a pitch, roll, or yaw rate, not specific control surface positions.
Somewhat uniquely, the F-16 control stick is in a fixed position, a force meter senses the
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operator’s applied force to receive role and pitch control inputs. After initial testing,
slight movement was added for pilot feedback but much less than a traditional control
stick. The control surface positions are determined by the flight computer based on
environmental data combined with pilot control inputs.
The autopilot system functions as a regulator, maintaining flight parameters
entered by the operator. Pitot-static, GPS, and inertial navigation sensors on the aircraft
feed flight and navigational data to the flight computer which adjusts the control surfaces
and thrust to meet the operator’s commanded flight parameters.
The Auto-GCAS is intended to prevent controlled flight into ground accidents.
This system is designed to prevent mishaps caused by operator’s loss of SA, spatial
disorientation, loss of consciousness from over-G, and gear-up landings. The aircraft
uses navigational and flight data combined with a global terrain map to determine if a
collision with the ground is imminent. If the aircraft senses that a ground collision is
imminent, audio and visual warnings are given to the operator. If the operator does not
act to prevent the collision the Auto-GCAS will right the aircraft (wings level) and fly
level on the aircraft’s last course. Auto-GCAS will relinquish control to the operator
when the operator begins making control inputs after the recovery. The operator has the
option to override Auto-GCAS recovery, but if no action is taken the Auto-GCAS will
recover the aircraft without any input from the operator.
To analyze the F-16 within the LHCA conceptual framework three flight
configurations needed to be categorized: autopilot disengaged, autopilot engaged, and
Auto-GCAS active. A discussion of the responsibilities of the operator and Auto-GCAS
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serves to illustrate how the LHCA conceptual framework can be applied in unique
control situations.
First consider the configuration where the F-16 is being operated with the
autopilot system disabled and the operator using the control stick, rudder pedals, and
thrust lever to control the aircraft. The operator is giving continuous control inputs, but
not commanding specific control surface positions, following the LHCA Decision Tree
the LHCA is 2, Augmented Control.
The second configuration considered was the operator controlling the aircraft with
the autopilot engaged. The operator does not provide continuous control inputs but
remains responsible for safety monitoring and obstacle avoidance tasks. Therefore, the
LHCA is 3, Parametric Control.
The final configuration to consider is a scenario where the Auto-GCAS has
sensed an imminent ground collision and has begun aircraft recovery. At first glance, this
configuration may seem to not be able to be categorized because the operator is not
providing any control inputs. However, the operator is using predetermined control
inputs, parameters determining the safe recovery altitude and cursing airspeed are
determined within the flight manual. Additionally, the aircraft’s post-recovery heading is
the heading before the Auto-GCAS was enabled. Therefore, the answer to the first
LHCA Decision Tree question is “exclusively discrete control” because these control
inputs are discrete not continuous.
The next question in the LHCA Decision Tree may also seem to cause an issue
for the LHCA framework. “Is the operator responsible for safety monitoring and obstacle
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avoidance?” This may cause confusion because the operator could be unconscious when
the Auto-GCAS is engaged, and yet the Auto-GCAS is not able to detect and avoid midair collisions with other aircraft. This begs the question, is the operator responsible for
avoiding other aircraft while unconscious? In this case, yes, as the Auto-GCAS is simply
meeting and maintaining flight parameters until further notice and not actively avoiding
mid-air collisions. Responsibility for avoiding all obstacles that are not in the aircraft’s
onboard terrain map, which the Auto-GCAS depends on, falls on the operator. The gap
between the Auto-GCAS capability to detect and avoid mid-air collisions, and the
operator’s capability to avoid them because of potential unconsciousness is a risk. The
LHCA is 3, Parametric Control with a risk of mid-air collisions accepted by aircraft
designers and operators.

1974, Airbus A300-600R.
The flight control systems of the Airbus A300-600R are similar to the B-2 and F16 aircraft because it has fly-by-wire and autopilot systems. The two different flight
configurations, autopilot enabled and autopilot disabled, are operated at LHCA 2 and 3
respectively. To categorize these two configurations one would apply the same logic that
was used to categorize the flight configurations as the B-2 and F-16.
On 26 April 1994, an Airbus A300-600R crashed at Nagoya airport in Japan
because of operator confusion about the current LHCA. The aircraft’s autopilot was
engaged in takeoff/go-around (TO/GA) mode by the first officer. When the pilot took
control and attempted to land the aircraft manually the aircraft entered an unrecoverable
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stall at low altitude (Beringer & Harris, 1999). As the aircraft did a low pass over the
runway (go-around) the pilot pushed forward on the yolk and reduced throttle in an
attempt to land the aircraft. However, because the autopilot was engaged in the TO/GA
mode the autopilot counteracted the pilot’s control inputs using the aircraft’s trim control
surfaces which the autopilot maintained control of. The reduced throttle input given by
the operator and the autopilot’s trim input caused the aircraft to pitch up sharply, then
stall and crash. Two hundred sixty four of 271 people onboard were killed in the
accident (Ministry of Transportation, 1996).
This case is an example of an operator providing control inputs at LHCA 2 while
the aircraft was in a mode where it could effectively receive control inputs only at LHCA
3. This accident highlights the need for clear communication of LHCA expectations
between the pilot and aircraft.

2006, HRP, manufactured by Kawada Industries, modified by CMU
This bipedal robot was initially developed by Kawada industries and then
modified by CMU to operate at LHCA 2, Augmented Control. The CMU HRP is
controlled in real time with a joystick by a single operator. The operator moves the
joystick in a direction and the HRP responds by taking steps in that direction. The
operator remains responsible for determining the path of the robot to avoid obstacles. If
the operator relaxes the joystick to the rest position the robot will stop and maintain
balance (Chestnutt et al., 2006).
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Balance is a constant challenge for the HRP because of its bipedal nature. Much
like a human, standing still requires micro adjustments to maintain balance. As the robot
picks up one of its two feet and moves it forward, the robot must ensure that it’s center of
gravity (CoG) remains positioned under the other foot to prevent a fall. The CMU HPR
control scheme allows a non-technical operator to control this very complex machine by
removing the operator from the balance control loop. The operator simply guides the
robot in the desired direction using the joystick.

2016, DJI Phantom 4
This multi-rotor consumer UAS is equipped with many sub-systems which allow
it to be operated at LHCA 2, 3, 4, or 5. Below, each flight configuration is described and
categorized within the LHCA conceptual framework.
The default flight mode for the Phantom 4 is a fly-by-wire system where the
operator uses joysticks to provide control inputs to the UAV. By manipulating the
control sticks the operator is commanding pitch, role, yaw, and power settings. The
operator’s commands are achieved by adjusting relative power, and therefore lift, of the
rotors to maneuver the UAV. Following the LHCA Decision Tree will show that in its
default mode the UAV is controlled at LHCA 2.
The Phantom 4 can also be controlled by commanding flight parameters and
waypoints. The operator can set waypoints using an interactive map as well as airspeed
and altitude settings. When commanded, the UAV will fly on a course directly toward
the waypoint at the specified altitude and airspeed, not avoiding any obstacles. Under
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these conditions the UAV is being operated at LHCA 3 Parametric Control, because the
operator maintains responsibility for obstacle avoidance and the UAV is simply
following specified parameters. (DJI, 2016)
The UAV has a relevant flight mode called “ActiveTrack.” When this flight
mode is activated, the UAV will track a target with the onboard camera. As the target
moves, the camera and UAV itself will move to keep the target centered in the camera’s
field of view. The UAV has obstacle avoidance sensors which will help the UAV avoid
both stationary and moving obstacles while tracking the target. Under these conditions
the operator is controlling the UAV at LHCA 4 because the operator is not providing
continuous control inputs and is not responsible for flight safety, but has not commanded
an entire mission to be completed, just a goal. (DJI, 2016)
The Phantom 4 has several other flight modes which allow it to be operated at
LHCA 4. A mode called “TapFly” allows the operator to tap a location on the camera’s
video feed, the UAV will fly to that location avoiding obstacles on the way. When the
“Return To Home” mode is activated the UAV will fly to a predetermined location if the
radio connection is lost, plotting its own course and avoiding obstacles (DJI, 2016).
Finally, this UAV can be controlled at LHCA 5 using a 3D mapping function. To
use this function, an operator selects the 3D mapping mode, specifies the area to be
mapped, and then commands the UAV to execute the orders. The operator may adjust
settings such as the number of photos to be taken per linear foot and the flight altitude
which both relate to the resolution of the final 3D image. When commanded, the UAV
will take off, fly to the area to be mapped, overfly and take aerial photography of the
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specified area on a course which the system has determined, and finally return to and land
at the takeoff location. In addition, during its flight the UAV will avoid obstacles. This
is considered LHCA 5 instead of LHCA 4 because the operator does not provide
intermittent commands between the beginning and end of the mission. Therefore, the
UAV executes the mission completely autonomously.
This type of telerobotic control, with many operational modes at different LHCA,
enables the operator to control the vehicle at the desired level of detail. The UAV can be
controlled with a low level of detail when the operator does not want to allocate much
attention to control of the UAV. For example, if the operator wanted to record
themselves performing a recreational activity they would use a mode which enabled
LHCA 4. In contrast the operator may need to perform a task which requires a high level
of detail of control such as slaloming between obstacles, in this case an operator would
use the default flight mode and control the UAV at LHCA 2. The versatility of control
options, enabling many LHCA, increases the operational flexibility of this UAV.

2016, PRENAV Drone System
The PRENAV UAS is a system which is designed to inspect hard to reach
locations such as cellular and radio transmission towers or windmills. This system is
specifically designed to be operated at LHCA 5, allowing laymen to operate the system.
To control the UAS, the operator indicates what the inspection target is. Next the UAS
plots a course and when commanded flies that course, returning to its starting location
when the inspection is complete. This UAS replaces a previous generation of systems
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which were controlled at LHCA 2 and required a high level of operator training to
operate (McSweeney, 2016).
While this UAS is interesting in itself, the primary point of interest here is that
LHCA was a design requirement. It was important that a very low level of detail of
control inputs be provided to the UAS by the operator. This requirement enables lower
labor costs and more flexible operations for the users. As more automation is
incorporated into systems, it is possible that LHCA may be a driving design requirement
for many systems of the future.
Overall, the results of the analysis of existing real world systems illustrates a total
of 16 system states from nine different systems within 3 different industries were
successfully categorized into one of the five LHCAs. This evaluation was complete by
answering the small set of questions shown in the decision tree shown in Figure 5.

3. Analysis of Hypothetical Systems within the LHCA Conceptual Framework
The presentation of hypothetical systems which can be configured to operate at
each LHCA helps to show trends in the effect of LHCA on system operations and more
clearly differentiates between each level. Three systems, a fixed wing UAV, a bipedal
UGV, and a treaded EOD UGV with a manipulator arm and gripper, were chosen for this
analysis. These hypothetical systems were chosen because they each operate in very
different domains, all of which are of interest to the DoD, and illustrate how these types
of systems could be operated at each LHCA.
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Fixed Wing UAV
The fixed wing UAV is the first hypothetical system to be analyzed within the
LHCA conceptual framework. Below, Table 5 describes each of the five configurations
of the hypothetical system. The LHCA, the operator’s control inputs, the relevant aspects
of the control system, and an explanation of the LHCA are given for each configuration.

Table 5 – Hypothetical Fixed Wing UAV configurations
LHCA

1, Direct
Control

2, Augmented
Control

3, Parametric
Control

Operator Control
Inputs
The operator uses
control sticks to control
the UAV. Two joysticks
control elevator, aileron,
rudder, and motor
power.

Control System
Description

LHCA explanation

Signals received from
the operator indicate
servo positions and
motor power directly.

The operator is
deciding exact servo
positions and motor
power.

The operator uses
control sticks to control
the UAV. Two
joysticks control pitch,
yaw, role, and thrust.

Signals received from
the operator are
processed by a
stability control
system which sets
servo positions and
motor power.

The operator is
deciding what flight
maneuvers to perform,
but the stability
controller is deciding
exact control surface
positions.

The operator enters
desired altitude,
airspeed, and heading
into a control panel.

Signals received from
the operator, onboard
navigation and flight
data sensors are used
to fly aircraft as
desired.

The operator enters
desired flight
parameters, the system
works to achieve those
parameters. The
operator remains
responsible for safety.
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4, Goal Oriented
Control

The operator selects the
pre-programed goal to
return home while
avoiding obstacles.

A signal to return
home is received by
the UAV. The UAV
uses navigation tools,
optical sensors, and
stability control to fly
'home.' Obstacles are
detected and avoided.

The operator enters a
desired goal, the system
determines the required
actions to achieve the
goal and then executes
these actions.

5, Mission
Capable Control

The operator selects a
mission from preprogramed options,
enters specific mission
parameters, and
commands mission
execution.

The UAV receives the
mission parameters
from the ground
station, navigates to
the operational area,
achieves mission
goal(s), and navigates
to and lands at 'home.'

The operator enters the
mission, the system
determines how to
achieve the mission and
requires no further
input from the operator
after the execution
order.

The Direct Control, LHCA 1, configuration is controlled by the operator using
two joysticks, each joystick axis controls a control surface or the motor power. In this
configuration, the operator is controlling the exact settings for all aspects of control using
continuous control inputs, as is expected for a system controlled at LHCA 1.
The Augmented Control, LHCA 2, configuration is also controlled with two
joysticks; however, each joystick axis controls either the thrust or the role, pitch, or yaw
rate. This contrasts the Direct Control configuration because the position of the control
surface is not controlled by the operator, but an algorithm which considers the joystick
positions as one of its inputs.
The Parametric Control, LHCA 3, configuration functions just like the autopilot
systems described in the real-world system section. The operator sets flight parameters
and the UAV adjusts the control surfaces and motor power to achieve those parameters.

63

This indirect method of control using discrete control inputs which keeps obstacle
avoidance responsibilities with the operator is indicative of LHCA 3.
The Goal Oriented Control, LCHA 4, configuration allows the operator to enter
one of many pre-programed goals to be accomplished mid-mission. The example ‘return
to home’ is given in the Table 5 description, but any mid-mission goal would qualify for
LHCA 4. The operator commands the UAV to fly to a pre-determined location
designated ‘home’ and land there. Note that the command initiating this action may be a
loss of radio signal. The UAV then navigates ‘home’, accepting flight safety
responsibilities along the way. This configuration enables the level of human attention
required to drop dramatically. The operator may be fully engaged in another activity and
just receive notice when the goal is accomplished, or if some issue arises.
The Mission Capable Control, LHCA 5, configuration is controlled by the
operator before takeoff. The operator gives commands for the UAV to execute a mission,
specifying required parameters, the UAV then executes the mission without further
control inputs from the operator. Similar to LHCA 4, in this configuration the operator’s
required attention is dramatically reduced.
To further illustrate the differences between each LHCA a series of functional
decomposition diagrams were developed. The series of functional decompositions was
chosen to be included in the hypothetical UAV instead of other systems because this
system could be operated at each LHCA, allowing a graphical illustration of each LHCA.
This same exercise could be completed for any system, but the functional decomposition
would have different components. Obviously, an automobile would have a different set
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of decomposed functions than a UAV, but the automobile’s functions could also be
allocated to either the operator or the system at each LHCA.
The functions associated with the flight operations of the UAV were decomposed
and then allocated to either the system or the operator. The components of the UAV’s
Flight Operations were: Flight Control and Dynamic Mission Planning. These
components were decomposed further and then allocated to the entity responsible for the
leaf level function. Precise definitions of each leaf level function were described in bullet
format below:
•

Determine Flight Parameters – Setting the aircraft’s air speed, altitude, heading, rate
of climb/decent, or similar aspects of controlling the UAS

•

Determine Pitch/Roll/Yaw/Thrust – Continuously choosing the desired pitch, roll,
yaw, or thrust required to achieve the desired flight parameters.

•

Determine Control Surface & Motor Power - Continuously choosing the desired
elevator, aileron, rudder, and motor power required to achieve the desired pitch, roll,
yaw, or throttle setting.

•

Determine Intermediate Goals – Determine the next goal to be achieved during a
mission.

•

Determine Flight Path – Determine the desired course of the aircraft to achieve the
intermediate goal.
Determine Obstacle Avoidance Route – Determine how the aircraft should divert

from the desired flight path to avoid obstacles.
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The Hypothetical UAV functional decomposition of control related duties for
LHCA 1 is shown in Figure 8. When the UAV is controlled at LHCA 1 all control duties
are allocated to the operator.
•

Figure 8– Hypothetical UAV Functional Decomposition of Control Duties, LHCA 1
The Hypothetical UAV functional decomposition of control related duties for
LHCA 2 is shown in Figure 9. When controlled at LHCA 2, the operator is commanding
pitch, roll, yaw, and thrust. The system uses these inputs as well as flight data to
determine the control surface and motor power.
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Figure 9– Hypothetical UAV Functional Decomposition of Control Duties, LHCA 2
The Hypothetical UAV functional decomposition of control related duties for
LHCA 3 is shown in Figure 10. When controlled at LHCA 3, the operator is
commanding flight parameters such as airspeed, altitude, and heading. The system uses
these inputs as well as flight data to determine the pitch, roll, yaw, and thrust required to
meet those parameters, then manipulates the control surfaces and sets motor power as
required.

67

Figure 10– Hypothetical UAV Functional Decomposition of Control Duties, LHCA 3
The Hypothetical UAV functional decomposition of control related duties for
LHCA 4 is shown in Figure 11. When controlled at LHCA 4, the operator is
commanding intermediate goals for the system to achieve. The system must process the
assigned goal and work to achieve it without further control inputs from the operator until
the intermediate goal is achieved. Therefore, the system must determine its own flight
path and avoid obstacles while maneuvering to achieve the goal. In addition, the more
detailed flight decisions are allocated to the system as was the case for LHCA 2.
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Figure 11– Hypothetical UAV Functional Decomposition of Control Duties, LHCA 4
The Hypothetical UAV functional decomposition of control related duties for
LHCA 5 is shown in Figure 12. When controlled at LHCA 4, the operator commands a
full mission to be completed and the system must execute autonomously. To enable this
LHCA the system is responsible for setting and achieving intermediate goals on the path
to accomplishing the overall mission.
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Figure 12– Hypothetical UAV Functional Decomposition of Control Duties, LHCA 5
Bipedal UGV
The next system to be considered is a hypothetical bipedal UGV which can be
configured to be controlled at each LHCA. The intent of this analysis is to illustrate that
complex systems are very difficult to control at LHCA 1 and to show how a system in
this domain could be operated at each LHCA. Table 6 describes each of the five
configurations of the hypothetical system. The overall system description is included in
Chapter 4.
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Table 6– Hypothetical Bipedal UGV LHCA configurations
LHCA

Operator Inputs

Control System
Description

LHCA explanation

1, Direct
Control

The operator must
specify the position
of every joint
continuously.

An operator sets the
position/angle of each
joint continuously and
maintains UGV balance.

The operator is responsible
for setting the joint
positions for the UGV. The
operator must provide
continuous input for all
joints and maintain balance
of the system as it
maneuvers.

2,
Augmented
Control

The operator uses a
control stick to
command direction
and speed of travel.

Signals received from the
operator are processed by
a stability control system
which controls the joint
positions.

The operator decides where
the UGV should travel and
provides continuous control
inputs, but the stability
controller is deciding exact
servo positions.

3,
Parametric
Control

The operator enters
desired waypoints,
the operator is
responsible for
determining the
exact walking path
of the UGV.

In combination with
onboard navigational
sensors, parameters and
waypoints are received
from the operator and are
used to guide the UGV
through the desired path.

The operator enters the
desired path of travel, the
system determines the
actions to take to travel
along that path.

4, Goal
Oriented
Control

The operator selects
a desired preprogramed goal to
pick up a box at
waypoint A and
place it at waypoint
B, the UGV
determines the path
between points A
and B.

The UGV receives the
operator’s command and
then travels to point A,
detects the box, picks up
the box, travels to point B,
and puts the box down.
Then stands by for
additional instructions
from operator.

The operator enters a
desired goal, the system
determines what actions are
required to achieve that
goal and then works to
achieve that goal.

5, Mission
Capable
Control

The operator selects
mission parameters
from pre-programed
options, enters
specific mission
parameters, and
commands mission
execution.

The UGV receives the
operator’s command and
then executes the entire
mission without additional
input from the operator
after execution begins.

The operator enters an
entire mission, the system
determines exactly how to
achieve that mission and
requires no further input
from the operator after the
execution order.
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The primary point of interest with this system is that real time control of this
system would be virtually impossible at LHCA 1. An operator would be required to
control balance related micro adjustments manually without the aid of an active stabilizer
system. This would likely exceed what an operator could realistically handle for even a
simple task like walking, let alone any operational use of the UGV. The issues related to
controlling this hypothetical bipedal humanoid robot at LHCA 1 are similar to issues
related to controlling the B-2 as described earlier in this chapter. An operator requires the
assistance of active stabilization to effectively control a complex, unstable system.
By contrast this hypothetical system could be operated at LHCA 2. This control
scheme could function the same as the CMU HRP described earlier in this chapter. The
operator would provide guidance through a joystick on the desired direction and speed of
travel. In response to these control inputs controlling algorithms would activate the
actual servos controlling joint positions and move the UGV as commanded by the
operator.
When configured for Parametric Control the operator would set waypoints and
speed parameters for the UGV. The stability algorithms would still be used to maintain
balance and walk, but the input to those algorithms would be from the navigation
computer, not the operator’s joystick as in Augmented Control. In this configuration, the
UGV is not aware of obstacles, the operator is still responsible for obstacle avoidance. If
the operator were to set a waypoint on the far side of a hazard, the UGV would travel
directly toward the waypoint and trip on the obstacle. The operator must use waypoints
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to instruct the UGV on a safe path to follow during operations. Figure 13 below
illustrates how the operator would need to use the waypoints to guide the UGV around
any obsticles.

Figure 13 – Parametric Control Obstacle Avoidance

The Goal Oriented Control configuration allows the operator to command a goal.
The UGV is capable of achieving that goal without additional instructions from the
operator. The example given in the Table 6 is a command to move a box from point A to
point B. This example is depicted in Figure 14. The operator commands the goal, then
the UGV executes the goal without further instruction from the operator, even if obstacles
are in the direct path. This scenario assumes that the mission for the UGV was more
involved than moving the box from point A to point B. If moving the box were the entire
mission, this would be an example of Mission Capable Control.
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Figure 14 – Goal Oriented Control Example
If the UGV is configured for Mission Capable Control, the operator will be able
to command the entire mission to the UGV. The UGV would be instructed on what must
be done then would autonomously execute that mission without further guidance from the
operator. For instance, the robot might be commanded to move boxes from a stack to
their appropriate locations within a warehouse.

EOD UGV
This hypothetical EOD UGV is designed to be able to transport itself several
hundred yards, from a safe location where it is deployed to the location of the hazardous
ordinance and then manipulate the ordinance with a gripper. The two phases of operation
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(i.e., transit and manipulation) will be considered separately for the LHCA analysis.
During the transit phase the UGV is traveling, during the manipulation phase the UGV is
using the manipulator arm to grip the ordinance. Table 7 below briefly describes the
hypothetical EOD UGV configurations. A photo of how this UGV may look is shown in
Figure 15 below.

Table 7 – Hypothetical EOD UGV LHCA configurations
LHCA

Operator Inputs

Control System
Description

1, Direct
Control Transit Phase

The operator uses 2 joysticks
to control the treads
independently giving the
capability to move forward,
backward, turn while
traveling, or spin in place.

Signals received from
operator indicate tread
rotation motor power for
each tread directly.

1, Direct
Control Manipulation
Phase

2,
Augmented
Control Transit Phase

A separate set of three
joysticks control the robotic
arm and gripper for
manipulation. Each axis of
motion of the joysticks
controls a separate joint on
the UGV.
The operator uses joysticks to
control UGV locomotion. On
board sensors detect
overbalancing and prevent
UGV actions that would
cause a roll-over.
Additionally, a stabilization
system on the arm
instantaneously and
automatically counteracts
unintentional bouncing
motion in the arm during
transit.

Signals received from
the operator indicate arm
and gripper servo
positions directly.

Signals received from
the operator are
processed by the
stability control system
which then passes
signals along to control
tread motors and arm
servo position.
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LHCA
explanation

The operator is
deciding exact
servo positions
and motor power
for each aspect of
the UGV

The operator is
deciding what
actions should be
taken, but the arm
and locomotion
stability control
systems are
deciding exact
final control inputs
to the motors and
servos.

Signals received from
the operator are
processed by the control
system and the auto-grip
system which then pass
signals along to the arm
and gripper servos. An
example of a degree of
freedom of motion is
moving the end of the
arm left or right, this
may result in many
servos working in
combination to
coordinate this action,
for example the "wrist"
of the robot arm would
compensate for the
sideways motion to
maintain the orientation
of the gripper which
would be a different
degree of freedom.

The operator is
deciding what
actions should be
taken, but the arm
control and autogrip systems are
deciding exact
final control inputs
to the motors and
servos.

3, Parametric
Control Transit Phase

The operator inputs
waypoints for the UGV to
travel between as well as a
speed to maintain. The
operator is responsible for
maneuvering around
obstacles.

Signals received from
operator in combination
with onboard navigation
sensors are used by the
UGV to travel to the
desired location.

The operator
enters a desired
ground path and
travel parameters,
the system
determines what
actions should be
taken to achieve
those parameters.

3, Parametric
Control Manipulation
Phase

The operator inputs desired
arm and gripper positions,
then presses an "execute"
button. This requires
multiple iterations of the
desired input then executes as
the ordinance is inspected and
manipulated.

Signals received from
the operator in
combination with
onboard proprioception
(knowledge of arm and
gripper position) allow
the UGV to move the
arm and gripper to the
position desired by the
operator.

The operator
enters discrete
inputs indicating
the desired
position of the
gripper and arm.
The system
manipulates the
arm to achieve the
desired position.

2,
Augmented
Control Manipulation
Phase

The operator uses joysticks to
control the arm, however
each axis on a joystick can
control a degree of freedom
of motion for the UGV arm
and gripper. Each degree of
freedom may affect the
position of multiple servos
working in combination. A
stabilization system ensures
smooth motion of arm and
gripper. Additionally,
sensors on the gripper detect
slippage of the explosive
ordinance device and apply
appropriate grip pressure to
prevent slippage without
applying unnecessary
pressure to the ordinance.
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4, Goal
Oriented
Control Transit Phase

The operator inputs desired
end position of UGV as well
as any desired areas to avoid
along the potential route,
such as buried landmines or
enemy occupied territory.

4, Goal
Oriented
Control Manipulation
Phase

The operator selects a desired
pre-programed goal, for
example "grab and lift
ordinance."

5, Mission
Capable
Control Both Phases

The operator selects mission
parameters from preprogramed options, for
example "grab and lift
ordinance located at Location
X then carry it to Location Y
and return to current
location.” As with LHCA 4,
the operator is required to
enter specific mission
parameters, for example "stay
out of area Z during transit."
Then commands mission
initialization.

The system uses
onboard navigation data,
environmental sensors,
and operator's inputs to
generate the route. The
UGV then travels along
that route with no further
input from operator.
The UGV will avoid
obstacles along the route
as that is a requirement
to achieve the goal.
The system uses
environmental sensors as
well as proprioception to
detect the ordinance,
then grab and lift it.

The operator
enters a desired
goal, the system
determines what
actions are
required to
achieve that goal,
and finally works
to achieve the
goal.

The UGV receives the
mission parameters from
the operator, then
navigates to the
ordinance, achieves
mission goal, and
navigates back to current
location.

The operator
enters the desired
goal of an entire
mission, the
system determines
exactly how to
achieve that
mission and
requires no further
input from the
operator after the
execution order.
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Figure 15 – Photograph of Hypothetical EOD UGV (“Talon EOD robot,” 2017)

Transit Phase
During the Transit Phase the Direct Control configuration of the UGV is
controlled by the operator with a pair of joysticks, each joystick controls the power to one
of the two treads. The operator is able to steer the UGV with differential power applied
to the treads. In this configuration, the operator is responsible for all decisions regarding
how the UGV interacts with its environment.
The Augmented Control configuration of the UGV is controlled similarly to the
Direct Control configuration, but with the addition of safeguard and stabilization features.
The operator provides the same types of control inputs, but an anti-roll system guards
against overbalancing the UGV. An onboard sensor detects the vehicle’s CoG and the
terrain angle. The stability system will not pass along commands which will cause a roll.
This system functions similar to an anti-stall or stick shaker in an aircraft, preventing
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possible human operator errors. In addition, the stabilization system uses inertial sensors
and servo controls to provide micro adjustments to stabilize the arm during transit. This
provides an active suspension feature to stabilize the arm during transport, preventing a
carried ordinance device from being unintentionally jostled.
The Parametric Control configuration is controlled similar to the hypothetical
bipedal UGV’s Parametric Control configuration. The operator will input waypoints and
speed, then the system will travel to those waypoints. The operator remains responsible
for obstacle avoidance.
The Goal Oriented Control configuration is also controlled similar to the
hypothetical bipedal UGV’s equivalent configuration. The operator commands a location
for the UGV to travel to along with any areas to avoid, then the vehicle will make its way
to the specified location.
There is not a transit phase and a manipulation phase for the Mission Capable
Configuration because the UGV does not intermittently receive instructions from the
operator. Instead the operator provides all relevant mission data before the before the
mission begins and the UGV autonomously accomplishes the mission. For this reason
the Mission Capable Configuration will not be discussed in the Manipulation Phase
section below.

Manipulation Phase
In the Direct Control configuration, the operator controls every aspect of the
vehicle directly. A set of three joysticks are used, each axis of the joysticks correlates to

79

a joint on the UGV arm or gripper. Just as with all systems, in the direct control mode no
“computer assistance” or “active stabilization” is provided by the UGV. Figure 16 below
shows how the joints would be controlled. Each set of arrows in the LHCA 1 portion of
the figure maps to an axis of one of the control sticks.
The Augmented Control configuration is also controlled with joysticks, but each
joystick controls a degree of freedom of the arm and gripper instead of a single joint.
This change means that when the operator provides a single control input the response on
the UGV may be several servos reacting in concert. This difference is illustrated in
Figure 16 below. In addition, active stabilization and auto-grip features are available.
The active stabilization system reduces vibrations in the arm and ensures that motions are
smooth instead of irregular. The auto-grip feature regulates the grip pressure of the UGV
to prevent slippage of anything in the gripper, while at the same time ensuring too much
pressure is not applied. These additional systems are examples of control at LHCA 2, the
operator uses continuous control inputs to instruct the UGV how to move then a
computer provides assistance to accomplish the operator’s intentions effectively.
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Figure 16– Difference between LHCA 1 and 2 during manipulation phase for the
EOD UGV

If the EOD UGV is operated in the Parametric Control configuration during the
manipulation phase, a set of challenges arise. The operator must give commands in the
format of parameters for the UGV to achieve. An operator would provide a control input
such as “move the manipulator arm down 4 inches” and the UGV would respond
appropriately with an action. To be clear, the control input described could be given with
just a few key strokes or a dial, but the information passed would be the control input
described above. The operator would need to repeat this process until the gripper was
closed on the device and the arm could be retracted for transit. This process becomes
even more challenging if the device is not in the open, but is behind some sort of
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immovable obstacle. In such a case the operator would need to give many detailed
control inputs to maneuver the arm around the obstacle and then grab the device.
The Parametric Control configuration is interesting because of the high level of
detail the manipulation phase demands. A classic example of LHCA 3 is an autopilot
system where the operator enters parameters for the vehicle to maintain and then takes a
monitoring role. This is an effective implementation of control at LHCA 3 because the
time required between control input is usually on the order of minutes or hours. In the
case of the EOD UGV during the manipulation phase a Parametric Control scheme a very
short period of time between control inputs is required. This issue was discussed further
in Chapter 6.
When the UGV is operated in the Goal Oriented Control configuration the
operator provides a single command to grab the ordinance and lift it, this may be done
with a few button presses on a touch screen video feed. With this single command the
UGV will move the arm and gripper to grasp and lift the ordinance.
As discussed in the Transit Phase section, LHCA 5 cannot be decomposed into
two phases. Therefore, it will not be further discussed in the Manipulation phase.
In summary, the analysis of hypothetical systems included the development of a
system configuration corresponding to each LHCA. Each configuration was then
analyzed within the LHCA conceptual framework. These hypothetical systems
demonstrated how a system could be operated at each LHCA. The functional analysis
showed how cognitive tasks associated with tele-robotic control are allocated between the
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system and the operator at each LHCA. With each increase in LHCA, more cognitive
tasks were allocated to the system, alleviating the operator from those task.
4. Breadth of Applicability of the LHCA framework
A major purpose of the LHCA conceptual framework is to provide a means for
classifying the level of detail of control inputs an operator provides to a tele-robot or
vehicle. Therefore, it is important to the LHCA framework’s validity that a wide variety
of vehicle and tele-robotic control methods can be classified. This requirement was
successfully demonstrated by categorizing a variety of vehicle’s and telerobotic control
configurations across domains. In total, 42 real-world and hypothetical control
configurations across six domains were categorized within the LHCA framework. The
domains were: automobile, fixed wing aircraft, wheeled/treaded UGV, legged UGV,
fixed wing UAV, and multi-rotor UAV. While the control configurations categorized
were obviously not exhaustive, they do demonstrate that the LHCA framework can be
applied to classify a wide variety of control configurations relevant to systems in motion.

5. Trends and Findings Regarding LHCA
To demonstrate that the LHCA framework is useful, trends and conclusions about
control configurations associated with each level are important to understand. During
analysis, two primary trends emerged: 1) as LHCA increases, the required level of human
mental and physical effort, as well as attention decreases and 2) as LHCA increases
operational flexibility decreases. In addition to the overall trends, each LHCA has
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associated traits. Those traits may make control of a system at a particular LHCA
desirable for a user’s needs. These traits and conclusion are described below.
Furthermore, during this research some notable topics related to LHCA were
exposed. Discussion on liability and accountability issues related to LHCA, how mission
requirements can affect the appropriate LHCA, the relationship between system
complexity and LHCA, and the relationship between LoA and LHCA add additional
insight to this analysis.

LHCA, Responsibilities, and Human Attentiveness
Every system has an associated set of responsibilities delegated to either the
operator or the system to ensure effective operation. As LHCA increases, responsibilities
are reassigned from the operator to the system. This reduction in operator responsibility
directly leads to a reduction in the number of required human control inputs.
Correspondingly, the amount of required human attention decreases as LHCA increases
because operator responsibility decreases. As the level of detail of control inputs
decreases the operator can devote less attention to controlling the motion of the system.
The decrease in human attention may correlate to a decrease in workload and the ability
to dedicate attention to other duties, including maintaining SA or other system aspects.
Follow on research should investigate these potential relationships.
At LHCA 1 and 2 continuous control inputs are required. The operator must be
able to continually monitor some aspect of the system or environment and remain
constantly physically engaged with the system, which requires a high degree of attention.
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The implication of this is easily illustrated with car accident statistics because most cars
are operated at LHCA 1. According to the United States Department of Transportation
10% of all fatal crashes in 2014 involved a distracted driver (Highway Traffic Safety
Administration & Department of Transportation, 2014). In these accidents, the amount
of attention devoted to the task of driving by the vehicle operators dropped below the
required threshold at the time of the accident.
At LHCA 3, the operator provides discrete control inputs. Some responsibilities
have been delegated to the system at LHCA 3, such as maintaining parameters, but the
operator remains fully responsible for monitoring the system during operation. This
allows the operator some freedom to reallocate attention away from the task of
controlling the system. For example, a pilot may briefly review airfield specific landing
procedures while operating an aircraft at LHCA 3 during the cruise phase of flight. In
this scenario, the pilot is still responsible for ground and aircraft collision avoidance, but
because those hazards are predictable and low threat when properly deconflicted, the
pilot can split attention between system operation and landing preparation.
When operating at LHCA 4 and 5, control of the motion of the vehicle requires
even less attention from the operator because safety monitoring tasks have also been
delegated to the system. A great example of this is a video capture multi-rotor UAV
tracking the operator as they engage in a recreational activity. Once the system is
activated, the operator may be skiing or rock-climbing, devoting no attention whatsoever
to the system. The operator is completely free to complete other tasks while the system
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maintains video tracking, ground/obstacle avoidance, and battery/fuel monitoring
responsibilities.

LHCA and Operational Flexibility
Another major trend is the correlation between LHCA and operational flexibility.
In this context, the term operational flexibility refers to a system’s ability to be used as
required by the operator, even if that is outside of normal operations. At LHCA 1, the
operator has complete control over the system; at LHCA 5, the operator is not even
required to know what a system is doing on a moment-to-moment basis and the system
may not be able to perform tasks it was not initially designed for. At higher LHCA the
operator may not be able to provide a fine enough level of detail of control inputs to
accomplish a mission as desired. Therefore, there is a negative correlation between
LHCA and operational flexibility.
In his book, The Design of Everyday Things, Norman discusses a concept very
similar to this negative correlation between LHCA and flexibility. He compares a
concept of activity-centered controls to one of device-centered controls. Activitycentered controls are controls where inputs are provided based on the mode of operation.
Device-centered controls are controls where inputs are given based on a system’s subsystem metrics. Norman’s activity-centered controls are equivalent to operating a system
in LHCA 4, providing goals the system should achieve. Whereas Norman’s devicecentered controls are more like LHCA 1, providing inputs directly to how a system’s
components should behave. As Norman points out, activity-centered controls are very
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convenient when a system is operating normally, but can be frustrating and limit the
flexibility of a system when abnormal operations are required (Norman, 2013).
Consider a case where a test of an aircraft’s stall performance was desired. An
example of a LHCA 2 system might be a stall protection system, preventing the operator
from stalling the aircraft by mandating thrust and pitch limits. If the stall protection
system were active on the aircraft when stall performance was to be tested the operator
would need to disable the system before the test could be performed. In this example, the
LHCA must be reduced to provide the flexibility required to accomplish the desired test
mission.
Another example of the loss of flexibility at higher LHCA is the F-16 AutoGCAS. This system will prevent a gear up landing by initiating a pull up maneuver
before touchdown. However, if a malfunction were to occur to the aircraft’s landing gear
and a gear-up landing was required to recover the aircraft, the Auto-GCAS system would
interfere. On 27 February, 2007 A Dutch F-16 Block 20 experienced a loss of nose gear
during takeoff and needed to conduct a gear-up landing. After the mishap, the aircraft
was safely recovered, repaired, and returned to service (Federal Aviation Administration,
2016a). If the Auto-GCAS were enabled, with the system controlled at LHCA 3, the
aircraft might not be permitted to conduct the required maneuver.
As the LHCA for a system increases, more detailed decisions about how a system
should behave are delegated to the system. The removal of the operator from the
decision loop reduces the operator’s ability to precisely control the system. If a mission
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is to operate outside of standard operating procedures, a lower LHCA may be required
unless the system can be modified to support the alternate mission.

LHCA, HSI, and Other Traits
This section describes traits associated with each LHCA as well as some
anticipated HSI effects of LHCA. The anticipated HSI effects of LHCA were not
verified in this research, but are posited to be present. Follow on research should
investigate the effects described in Table 8.
When conducting a cost-benefit analysis the traits described above should be
considered. Table 8 could be used by system designers to select the appropriate
LHCA(s) for a system under design. It should be noted that these traits should be
considered relative. That is, if a particular system were to be configured to be operated at
a LHCA, the traits apply relative to other configuration options. The traits do not apply
when comparing one system to another. For example, an aircraft controlled at LHCA 3
may require more training than an automobile controlled at LHCA 1. However, an
aircraft controlled exclusively at LHCA 3 would require less training than the same
aircraft which is expected be controlled at LHCA 1.

Table 8 – LHCA Traits

1, Direct
Control

Level of Human Control Abstraction
2,
3,
4, Goal
Augmented
Parametric
Oriented
Control
Control
Control
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5, Mission
Capable
Control

Operator
Attention
Required

Maximum
operator
attention is
required, the
system will
not provide
any control
assistance and
the operator
must be
attentive.

The operator
must maintain
constant
awareness of
the system
and
environment,
some control
assistance
may reduce
some peak
attention
scenarios.

Maximum
control and
flexibility is
given to the
operator.

Operator
maintains a
high amount
of control
and
flexibility,
may not be
suitable for
some unique
uses.

Maximum
demand and
responsibility
is placed on
operator, this
may result in
a smaller
personnel
pool to draw
from.

A high
amount of
responsibility
is placed on
the operator,
personnel
pool will
remain
reduced

Operator
Control and
System
Flexibility

Personnel
Availability
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The operator
may reduce
attention to
perform
auxiliary
tasks,
however,
remains
responsible
for system
safety and
must be
available to
intervene if
necessary.
The operator
maintains
control over
most
behavior of
the system,
but sacrifices
precise
control for
less control
inputs.

Constant
attentiveness
and a 'feel' for
control of the
system are
not necessary,
the personnel
pool size
increases
over LHCA
2.

The operator’s
required
attention is
dramatically
reduced. The
operator must
be available to
provide
intermediate
goals, but has
relinquished
safety
responsibilities.

The operator
could
potentially be
completely
inattentive of
the system
during the
mission.

Flexibility is
reduced
relative to
LHCA 4. The
system must
be
preprogramed
or capable of
self-adaptation
and the
operator
must know
the full
mission
requirements
before
execution.
Personnel availability is greatly
increased. Virtually any
responsible person who can
select goals necessary to perform
a mission should be able to
operate the system.
At LHCA 4 and 5 a single
operator may be capable of
controlling multiple systems
simultaneously. This could
increase personnel availability.
Flexibility is
dramatically
reduced. If
the system is
not preprogramed or
capable of selfadaptation to
complete a task
it cannot be
completed.

Training
requirements
will be
highest at this
level, the
operator must
understand
System
Knowledge precisely how
and Training the system
Requirements functions for
maximum
effectiveness.

Unstable
systems
should not
be operated
at this level.

General
Comments

Training
requirements
will remain
high, but less
understanding
of subsystems
is required.

In most
applications
where
continuous
control inputs
are used,
Augmented
Control is
desirable
instead of
Direct
Control.
However, the
cost of
implementing
is usually
greater than
Direct
Control.

Training
requirements
are reduced
because the
operator does
not need to
gain muscle
memory of
control
movements,
system
understanding
is reduced to
knowledge of
system
capabilities.
This LHCA is
not suitable
for
applications
where a high
level of detail
is required,
the best use is
applications
where system
parameter
stability for a
long period of
time is
desirable.

Training
requirements
and system
knowledge are
both
dramatically
reduced. The
operator only
needs to know
the system's
capabilities and
mission
requirements.

System
Knowledge
and Training
Requirements
are the
reduced
below that of
LHCA 4
because an
operator is not
required to
form submission goals.

During
operations, it is
possible the
operator may
be available
for other
tasks,
depending on
the time
between
intermediate
goals assigned
to the system.

It is very
likely that a
single
operator
could control
multiple
systems at this
LHCA
because the
operator will
not be
involved in
system control
unless a
failure occurs

Table 8 includes information on the correlation between LHCA and operator
attention, operational flexibility, personnel availability, training requirements, and some
general comments. The negative correlations between LHCA and operator attention as
well as operational flexibility were discussed in detail above.
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A positive correlation between the available personnel pool and LHCA is
anticipated because the demand on the operator is decreased as LHCA increases. The
number and challenge of physical and mental activities an operator must be capable of
decreases as LHCA increases. With less challenge, it is likely that more people will be
able to operate a system with a higher LHCA. This leads to a potentially larger pool of
personnel to draw from to operate any given system.
A negative correlation between LHCA and required system knowledge and
required training is also anticipated. With a more manual system the operator must have
a better understanding of not only what a system can do, but how it functions. This is
because at a higher LHCA the system filters the operator’s control inputs, avoiding
potential failure modes, but at lower LHCA the filters are removed. At lower LHCA the
operator must have a better understanding of how to avoid potential failures.
Additionally, at LHCA 1 and 2, the operator is providing continuous control inputs, often
these types of control inputs are associated with acquiring a skill to operate the system
effectively. Understanding not only how the system should move, but how the operator
must move to effectively achieve those system movements can take time to perfect.
Gaining a ‘feel’ for the controls and the associated muscle memory may take more time
then entering discrete control inputs.
The general comments described in Table 8 are conclusions that emerged from
the discussion in Chapter 5. The assertion that unstable systems should not be operated at
LHCA 1 is justified because unstable systems such as the bipedal UGV and the B-2 must
use at least LHCA 2 to avoid falling or crashing. Generally, LHCA 2 is desirable over

91

LHCA 1 except when development of the control system cost is prohibitive. This is
because the operator is usually able to effectively maneuver the system as desired at
LHCA 2 and often the challenge of operation would be reduced. LHCA 3 is not suitable
for applications where a high level of detail is required because the operator must
repeatedly input discrete control inputs to achieve the goal. The manipulation phase of
the hypothetical EOD UGV was a good example of how operating a system at LHCA 3
in a high detail environment can present challenges. The general comment assertions
about LHCA 4 and 5 are justified because of the reduced operator attention associated at
LHCA 4 and 5. With the task of system control demanding less of the operator’s
attention at these LHCA, the operator may be available to perform other tasks or to
operate more than a single vehicle.
It should be noted, however, that this discussion assumes that a system employs
only a single LHCA. As was demonstrated with many of the real-world systems and all
three of the hypothetical systems, often LHCA is dynamic, changing as appropriate
during operations. A designer may consider that by adding the capability of a system to
be operated at additional LHCA, their system could be operated at each LHCA, as
desired. The operator could dynamically switch between LHCA at any given time,
gaining the best traits from each LHCA for the situation.

Discussion on Liability and Accountability Issues Related to LHCA
Some confusion may arise when making the distinction between Parametric
Control (LHCA 3) and Goal Oriented Control (LHCA 4) because of the potential
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ambiguous distinction between responsibilities allocated to either the operator or the
system. This distinction is complicated further when legality and liability are involved.
Aspects of control, authority to act, may be delegated to the system, but the operator may
still be held accountable for the system’s performance.
This is a major issue facing society at large as the capability arises to create
systems which, from a technical perspective, could be operated at LHCA 4 or 5. These
systems may not be allowed to operate at LHCA 4 or 5, assigning safety related
responsibly to the system, because of regulatory issues. System manufacturers may never
be willing to accept legal responsibility for their products actions, when their common
use will involve delegating all control authority to the system.
Part of the purpose of the LHCA framework is to provide a lens through which
the way a system is controlled can be considered, resulting in clear and meaningful
distinctions between levels from the operator’s perspective. The distinctions between the
levels are intended to not be a technical assessment of how a system functions, but how
the operator controls it. The important distinction between liability for accidents falling
on the system operator, or not, incentivizes a certain level of attentiveness from the
operator.
This generates an issue for the LHCA framework, the technical capabilities of
systems enable possible operations at LHCA 4 or 5, but regulations and a clear
understanding of how to ensure safety are currently lagging. For example, many
automated driving features alleviate control tasks from the operator without accepting
any legal responsibility. A case in point is Tesla Motors’ Enhanced Autopilot feature
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which can replace the operator’s steering, throttle, and brake control inputs, leaving the
operator with no continuous control inputs while the system is activated. At the same
time, Tesla does not legally accept responsibility for car accidents caused while the
system is activated. While the system may, now or in the near future, be technically
capable of being allocated safety related tasks, and indeed has even been allocated all
control tasks, the system cannot be considered to be operating at LHCA 4 because safety
responsibilities have not been removed from the operator.
The DJI Phantom described earlier may operate at LHCA 4 and 5 because the
operator is issuing commands in a Goal or Mission oriented manor. However, accident
accountability is unclear in at this point. For example, the 2016 FAA document intended
to regulate small UAS operations states “Autonomous operations have numerous
practical applications, including agricultural operations, aerial photography, and search
and rescue. The FAA agrees with the commenters who pointed out that the ability for a
small unmanned aircraft to fly autonomously could add significant utility to a small UAS
operation and would further encourage innovation in the industry. Accordingly, this rule
will allow the autonomous flight of small unmanned aircraft.” Assignment of liability in
the case of an accident with an autonomous UAS was not addressed, however the FAA
emphasized that the operator must be able to command the UAS to land, if required.
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2016b)
The severity of a mishap may be a large factor in this area. A small UGV
traveling at a low velocity may have very little safety related concerns and therefore an
operator may be willing to decrease the level of detail of control inputs to LHCA 4 more
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easily. As autonomous systems and their operations are further developed, this will be a
key point of interest. A social, legal, or regulatory system must be developed before
operations at LHCA 4 or 5 will be made available for a broad variety of systems.

Discussion of Mission Requirements and LHCA
The majority of the discussion relating to LHCA was associated with different
configurations of systems because a system’s available control inputs affect LHCA.
However, mission requirements may also affect which LHCA is possible and optimal.
The amount of information available to an operator before a mission will affect whether
LHCA 5 is an option. For an operator to control a system at LHCA 5 they must know
generally what must be done during a mission, but that is not always the case.
Consider a common dynamic ground support mission a bomber might fly over
hostile territory. The aircraft may be assigned to enter a holding pattern over an area
where combat is expected, then await further orders to support ground operations. The
bomber may drop no ordinance or may drop all its ordinance, possibly even meeting up
with an aerial refueling tanker to extend its mission if required. This type of dynamic
mission where the mission requires follow-on orders is not possible at LHCA 5 because
intermediate orders are core to the mission.

Discussion on System Complexity and LHCA
Interestingly, the complexity of a control system is not a factor in determining the
LHCA a system is controlled at. For example, the CMU HRP was operated at LHCA 2,
95

enabled by an algorithm which determined how the system moved. This complex
algorithm, which was technically challenging to implement, enabled the system to
operate only at LHCA 2, even though many autopilot systems are much simpler and
provide a LHCA 3. Similarly, the fly-by-wire systems discussed earlier are complex and
take many sensors with complex algorithms to implement, but again are operated at
LHCA 2 while more simplistic systems, which simply regulate parameters are operated at
LHCA 3. This is because the level of detail of control inputs provided by the human is
higher with the LHCA 2 systems than with the LHCA 3 systems. It is important to
remember that the LHCA conceptual framework focuses on the operator’s control inputs,
not the technical complexity of the system being controlled.

Relationship between LoA and LHCA
The relationship between LoA and LHCA seems to have a loose positive
correlation. LoA has a focus on the authority granted to a system to make a decision
without human verification of that decision. LHCA has a focus on the level of detail of
decisions made by the operator. Thus, from a system design perspective, LoA is focused
on operator oversight, whereas LHCA is focused on human-machine
interface/communication. For LoA and LHCA, the low and high end of the scales are
very similar (assuming that LoA is applied to a control system of a system in motion):
systems are controlled completely manually or completely autonomously. However, the
increments between are quite different.
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The LoA framework is designed to apply more broadly then the LHCA
framework. The LoA framework can be useful in describing the level of automation for a
range of technologies which implement some function that could be performed by a
human. However, the LHCA framework has the limited scope focusing on vehicles and
tele-robotics and applies at the system level or system state level. That is LHCA is not
defined when analyzing a technology which automates as subfunction in the functional
hierarchy associated with controlling the motion of systems.
Other differences between these frameworks are the focus, differentiations
between levels, and the fact that the LoA framework does not evaluate the types of
decisions it is assessing. The focus of the LoA framework is the system while the focus
the LHCA framework is on the operator. The differentiations between levels in the LoA
framework are determined by the required oversight the system requires while the LHCA
framework focuses on the level of detail of decisions made by the operator. Finally, the
LoA framework does not evaluate the type of decision which is automated, while the
types of decisions allocated to the system or the operator are very important in assessing
a LHCA.
This is not to say the that LoA framework is not useful in assessing system
effectiveness. There are applications where the proper oversight of decisions made by a
system is an important trait that must be discussed. For example, if an autonomous UAV
were to be sent on a strike mission to attack a ground target, it is probably appropriate to
have some human oversight within the kill-chain. That level of human oversight can be
described with the LoA framework. Leadership may decide to require a human have veto

97

power over the decision to fire, LoA 6. Alternatively, leadership may decide that the
appropriate oversight for the human operator to initiate the ‘fire’ decision, LoA 5. In
either of these cases the LoA framework describes exactly that type of human oversight.
Another example where a different level of operator oversight would be appropriate is a
missile defense system. Likely, leadership would want to allocate a large amount of
autonomy to the system and not require operator oversight to initiate countermeasures.
Therefore, LoA of 10 might be specified as a design constraint.
The two frameworks, LoA and LHCA, describe different aspects of controlling a
system and both have their place. LoA describes the authority granted to a system,
whereas LHCA describes the level of detail of control inputs provided by the operator.

6. Evaluation of LHCA as a Scientific Theory
By applying the criteria developed by Jacobs and Grainger just as de Winter did
to evaluate Fitts list, the LHCA conceptual framework can be evaluated as a scientific
theory (de Winter & Dodou, 2014). Unfortunately, as this document introduces the
LHCA framework, not all the criteria can be applied. Specifically, the interpretability of
the LHCA framework cannot yet be evaluated because the framework has not been
applied by other researchers. Further, generalizability cannot be fully evaluated as
unknown systems have yet to be generated. Follow-on research should evaluate these
aspects of the framework. The other remaining criteria were assessed below:
Plausibility – The primary assumption of this research is that as the LHCA
increases the amount of operator attention required for system control decreases. This
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decrease in required operator attention will likely result in a reduction in workload. This
is consistent with Endsley’s concept of Control Granularity (Endsley, 2015). In addition,
the transfer of cognitive tasks from the operator to the system is assumed to result in a
reduction in workload for the operator as is consistent with the workload modeling
literature. This consistency with other research suggests that the LHCA framework is
plausible.
Explanatory adequacy – The framework lays out a basis for which the control of
systems can be categorized by the level of detail of control inputs provided by the
operator. This concept is consistent with the concepts discussed by Chen et al. (2007),
Endsley (2015), and Milgram et al. (1995).
Simplicity – The framework consists of five levels and has been shown to permit
the classification of 42 system control configurations within 11 different systems within 7
different domains through the application of a decision tree having only four questions.
There are also not a series of exceptions and situational rules which would add
complexity to the framework.
Descriptive Adequacy – The framework categorized the control of systems across
domains. Those categorizations were useful and had meaning because conclusions about
a system operating at a LHCA could be drawn. Those conclusions were reasonable and
aligned with data observed about the operation of those systems.
Generalizability – The framework was used to classify many systems, including
hypothetical systems. At this point, it is not possible to say that the LHCA framework is
generalizable to any future vehicles or tele-robotic systems. However, it is conceivable
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that the framework could be applied to existing and foreseeable future systems within its
scope.
The LHCA framework has been shown to meet five of the six criteria established
by Jacobs and Granger and applied by de Winter (de Winter & Dodou, 2014; Fitts, 1951;
Jacobs & Grainger, 1994). The sixth criteria, interpretability, should be evaluated with
follow-on research.

7. Summary of Analysis
This analysis covered the assessing of LHCA for both real world and hypothetical
systems, the effect of LHCA on system level traits, and LHCA evaluated as a scientific
theory. It was shown that the LHCA can be applied broadly and the LHCA of a control
configuration does have a system level effect. The evaluation of the LHCA conceptual
framework as a scientific theory showed that, while interpretability has not yet been
assessed, the LHCA framework has an acceptable academic pedigree.
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VI. Conclusions and Recommendations
1. Introduction of Conclusions
This chapter will summarize the results and overall conclusions of this research.
The LHCA conceptual framework will be evaluated against the recommendations of the
DSB (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology Logistics,
2012). Finally, recommendations for follow-on research into the LHCA conceptual
framework are proposed.

2. LHCA Alignment with DSB Recommendations
As discussed in chapter 1, the DSB proposed developing a framework that
focused on capabilities, cognitive functional allocation, and the trade-space of a system
operating at different levels within the framework (Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition Technology Logistics, 2012). The LHCA conceptual framework
was intended to adhere to these recommendations as closely as possible, providing a
useful tool to the DoD.
The LHCA framework is designed to categorize the control of a system, therefor
it is only able to express the capabilities of a system relating to the control of that system.
A capability desired by the DoD is the ability to control multiple tele-robots
simultaneously by a single operator (US DoD, 2005). As discussed previously, a system
controlled at LHCA 4 or 5 could potentially be operated in this way because the demands
on the operator’s attention are relatively low. The LHCA framework applies broadly to
vehicles and tele-robotic systems and these systems may have a myriad of capabilities.
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The framework does not have a focus on evaluating the capabilities of a system, but
within the range of control capabilities the LHCA adequately describes capabilities.
The LHCA focuses heavily on the functional allocation of cognitive tasks
between the operator and the system. The very definitions of each level revolve around
the level of detail of tasks that are allocated to the operator verses the system. The LHCA
framework aligns well with this recommendation by the DSB.
As recommended by the DSB any useful framework must be able to make the
system level trades visible. The LHCA framework achieves this goal through the initial
correlations between LHCA and both operational flexibility and operator attention. It is
also postulated that there are many other system level trades which could be made visible
using the LHCA framework, especially in the field of HSI. Follow-on research is
recommended to determine what the full trade-space is, but a foundation of potential
system level trades at different levels of the LHCA has been established.
In conclusion, the LHCA framework fulfills the functional allocation and system
level trade recommendations from the DSB. The narrow scope of control capabilities can
also be assessed with the LHCA framework. Overall, the LHCA framework generally
meets the requirements for an alternative to the LoA framework as recommended by the
DSBs and can be used by the DoD and others as a tool when assessing human control of
systems or when developing design requirements.

102

3. Proposed Follow-On Research
There are several opportunities for follow on research on the subject of LHCA.
Research into potential HSI and human performance effects described in Table 8 is
highly recommended. Quantitative research should be used to verify and categorized the
intensity of these effects. As discussed above, a correlation between required operator
attention and LHCA exists, it is likely that the reduction in required operator attention
will correlate to a reduction in operator workload.
Research into the effect of LHCA on SA should also be conducted. The
relationship between LHCA and SA may be complex. The operator’s SA may be
considered to have layers of detail similar to the concept of LHCA. For example, if the
operator is flying an aircraft at LHCA 1, the operator may notice a tendency for the
aircraft to drift in a certain direction. This drift may be negated by auto-trim features
associated with LHCA 2. Therefore, an operator may lose SA on this very detailed
aspect of aircraft performance. In contrast, if an operator were controlling an aircraft at
LHCA 4, they may be able to maintain higher SA regarding the operational context. By
focusing less on the details of the aircraft’s performance, the operator may be able to
have a better SA on the mission as a whole. Further research into both the concept of
level of detail of SA and the effect of LHCA on that SA should be pursued.
Another area of research to be pursued in this area is the concept of level of detail
of control inputs provided by the operator as applied outside the scope of vehicles and
tele-robotics as examined in this research. An example of a system which could be
assessed within the LHCA framework but is not a vehicle or tele-robotic system is a
home thermostat. A home thermostat could be considered to receive parametric control
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inputs, turning on and of aspects of a heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system to
regulate temperature. Another example is a handheld pistol-grip drill. This system could
be considered to receive direct control inputs, the position of the trigger setting the
precise motor power. This system may be considered to have augmented control if a
torque clutch is added, where an operator specifies the maximum torque of the drill and
the drill automatically disengages if that torque is reached. These concepts of level of
detail of control inputs may be applicable more broadly then examined in this research
and should be explored further.
Finally, a simple test of interpretability for the LHCA framework should be
conducted. The proposed experiment would provide descriptions of control
configurations and ask participants to classify an operator’s LHCA. The robustness and
repeatability of the LHCA framework could be tested in this experiment, demonstrating
that the LHCA framework is understandable and interpretable. This test would be
designed to show if a control system would be classified consistently within the LHCA
framework independent of the person classifying the system.

4. Summary of Significant Findings & Insights
This research proposed a conceptual framework for analyzing the level of detail
of control inputs an operator provides to vehicle and tele-robotic systems. The
framework itself was then examined, showing that it could be applied both broadly and
had the ability to make system level traits visible. The framework was also evaluated as
a scientific theory, meeting all five of the criteria examined. Finally, the LHCA was
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assessed against the DSB’s recommendations. The framework was shown to illustrate
control related capabilities, show cognitive task allocation between the operator and the
system, and make system level traits visible.
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